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Environmental Federalism:  
A Survey of the  
Empirical Literature 
Daniel L. Millimet † 
Abstract 
Generally, the debate over environmental federalism strongly 
focuses on anecdotal evidence and intuition. Empirical facts have not 
been the focus of arguments concerning the optimal allocation of 
environmental authority. For example, the Tiebout model, which 
highlights the positive side of decentralization as jurisdictions 
efficiently compete for mobile residents, relies on seven assumptions. 
Additionally, the group of models relying on the interjurisdictional 
competition framework, which have highlighted both the positive and 
negative outcomes of decentralized environmental authority, also rely 
on a number of assumptions. This Article assesses the empirical 
validity of many of these assumptions, concluding that the data may 
necessitate a rethinking of these assumptions. 
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Introduction 
Professor Bednar defines federalism as a “system of government 
characterized by semiautonomous states in a regime with a common 
central government” where “governmental authority is allocated 
between levels of government.”1 Professor Gordon notes that within a 
federal system “each unit of government decides independently how 
much of each type of public good to provide, and what types of taxes, 
and which tax rates, to use in funding the public goods.”2 While many 
countries contain a federal political system, the “optimal” allocation 
of authority across levels of government is the subject of constant 
research and debate.3 While much of this research and debate focuses 
on fiscal policy (taxation and expenditures), the allocation of 
authority over environmental decision making within a federal 
political system has also been discussed, deliberated, and agonized 
over for decades.4 The puzzle concerning the optimal allocation of 
environmental authority across levels of government is commonly 
referred to as environmental federalism. 
Although the issue of environmental federalism receives 
widespread attention across the globe, there is no resolution in sight.5 
Even some of the most prominent researchers in this area have a 
diverse set of beliefs. Professor Gordon concludes:  
Competition among communities should lead to greater 
efficiency and innovation. However, this paper has shown the 
many ways in which decentralized decision-making can lead to 
inefficiencies, since a local government will ignore the effects of 
its decisions on the utility levels of nonresidents. . . . In light of 
 
1. Jenna Bednar, The Political Science of Federalism, 7 Ann. Rev. L. & 
Soc. Sci. 269, 270 (2011). 
2. Roger H. Gordon, An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism, 
98 Q.J. Econ. 567, 567 (1983). 
3. See Bednar, supra note 1, at 282 (“[C]oncern for the distribution of 
authority will remain focal to the federalism literature.”). 
4. See Wallace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, 
in Recent Advances in Environmental Economics 1, 1–32 (John 
A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002). 
5. See Bednar, supra note 1, at 282 (“[A]s federalism theory continues to 
develop, it may come back full circle to its original question: What is 
the optimal distribution of authority between federal and state 
governments?”). 
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these costs arising from lack of coordination, it may be 
preferable to have the central government take responsibility for 
particular activities, in spite of the lost diversity.6  
Professor Oates states: “My own sense is that where environmental 
quality is basically a local public good, the case for the setting of 
environmental standards at an appropriately decentralized level of 
government is quite compelling. At the same time, one can envision 
an essential informational and guidance role for the central 
authority.”7 Professor Wilson concludes:  
As such, competition among governments has both good and 
bad aspects, the importance of which vary across the attributes 
of the goods and services that the governments provide. This 
assessment suggests a role for intervention by a central 
authority, but both political considerations and information 
problems should be carefully addressed.8  
Professor Adler states: “In sum, there is a strong case for a general 
presumption in favor of decentralization—a presumption that can be 
overcome in any specific policy context by demonstrating the need for 
federal intervention.”9 Professor Levinson writes: “The conclusion 
must be that under most practical circumstances, local environmental 
authority will lead to inefficient regulations.”10 
The diversity of views concerning the appropriate allocation of 
environmental authority also plays out in practice as different 
federations have “resolved” the issue differently. For example, the 
well-known Principle of Subsidiarity emanating from the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992 constitutionalizes the delegation of environmental 
authority by dictating that centralized action is only allowed in 
situations where policy objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved 
through decentralized action.11 This is consistent with the so-called 
Decentralization Theorem put forth by Professor Oates:  
 
6. Gordon, supra note 2, at 584–85. 
7. Oates, supra note 4, at 22–23. 
8. John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 Nat’l Tax J. 
269, 298 (1999). 
9. Jonathan H. Adler, Jursidictional Mismatch in Environmental 
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 130, 138 (2005). 
10. Arik Levinson, Environmental Regulatory Competition: A Status Report 
and Some New Evidence, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 91, 103 (2003). 
11. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons 
for the European Union and the International Community, 83 Va. L. 
Rev. 1331, 1340–41 (1997).  
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[I]n the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision of 
a [local public] good and of interjurisdictional external effects, 
the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically 
higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption of the good are 
provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of 
consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions.12  
In contrast, the delegation of authority is not constitutionalized in the 
United States except insofar as decentralized policymaking is not 
allowed to interfere with interstate commerce.13 As a result, 
environmental authority in the United States has oscillated between 
periods of relatively greater centralized and decentralized control.14 
Given this backdrop, the objectives of this article are twofold. 
The first objective is to provide a very brief summary of the main 
theoretical models put forth in the literature. The reason for doing so 
is to illuminate the issues that play a fundamental role in conclusions 
regarding the optimal allocation of environmental authority. The 
second objective is to then provide a comprehensive survey of the 
relevant empirical literatures for the first time in the legal literature. 
By doing so, the goal is to limit the scope of the debate over 
environmental federalism moving forward, as well as make clear where 
the gaps in empirical knowledge exist. 
I. Environmental Federalism in Theory 
The two primary theoretical frameworks used to explore the 
effects of the decentralization of policy decisions such as taxes, 
expenditures, environmental standards, etc. derive from Professor 
Tiebout and the literature on interjurisdictional competition.15 
The Tiebout model highlights the positive side of decentralization 
as jurisdictions compete for mobile residents in such a way that yields 
outcomes that are efficient.16 As laid out by Professor Revesz, the 
 
12. Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 54 (1972). 
13. See Revesz, supra note 11, at 1340 (“In the United States, the choice 
between federal and state regulation (except when state regulation is 
coupled with trade restrictions) is, for the most part, a matter of 
policy.”). 
14. See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman, & John C. Millian, Toward 
a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental 
Law, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 313 (1985); see also Levinson, supra note 
10, at 96–97 (describing expenditures on environmental regulation and 
monitoring by states and the federal government from 1972 to 1994). 
15. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. 
Econ. 416, 416 (1956). 
16. See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. 
Econ. Literature 1120, 1124 (1999) (“In this model, highly mobile 
households ‘vote with their feet’: they choose as a jurisdiction of 
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model relies on “seven important assumptions.”17 First, individuals are 
perfectly mobile across jurisdictions and have heterogeneous 
preferences over jurisdictional attributes. Second, individuals have 
perfect knowledge concerning the attributes of all jurisdictions, which 
include the “head tax” levied on residents and the level of public 
goods and services provided. Third, there exist a large number of 
jurisdictions. Fourth, employment does not affect individual 
residential choice as income is derived via dividends. Fifth, there are 
no interjurisdictional externalities. Sixth, every jurisdiction has a 
(known) optimal size where the average cost of services provided is 
minimized. Seventh, jurisdictions below their optimal size seek to 
attract new residents.18  
Professor Brueckner provides a concise summary of the model:  
Tiebout argued that, in attempting to attract residents, fiscally 
autonomous subnational governments will tailor public spending 
to suit individual preferences, leading consumers to sort across 
jurisdictions according to their demand for public goods. With 
each individual able to exactly fulfill his or her demand in some 
jurisdiction, the economy achieves a market-like outcome in the 
provision of public goods.19  
Thus, under the assumptions of the model, this market-like outcome 
is efficient. 
In contrast, the interjurisdictional competition framework nests 
both the positive and negative sides of decentralization as 
jurisdictions compete for mobile resources, typically taken as capital. 
Dating back at least to Oates’s 1972 model, the framework has led to 
a variety of theoretical models.20 The 1988 model of Professors Oates 
and Schwab provides a useful starting point in the literature.21  
 
residence that locality that provides the fiscal package best suited to 
their tastes. In the limiting case, the Tiebout solution does indeed 
generate a first-best outcome that mimics the outcome in a competitive 
market.”). 
17. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 
67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1236 (1992). 
18. Id. 
19. Jan K. Brueckner, Fiscal Decentralization with Distortionary Taxation: 
Tiebout vs. Tax Competition, 11 Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 133, 133 
(2004). 
20. See generally Oates, supra note 12. 
21. Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among 
Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. Pub. 
Econ. 333 (1988).  
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Oates and Schwab find that it is possible for decentralized 
environmental authority to be efficient even with interjurisdictional 
competition for capital.22 However, this result requires numerous 
assumptions.23 First, individuals are homogeneous and immobile 
across jurisdictions. Second, capital is perfectly mobile across 
jurisdictions, seeking to maximize after-tax returns, and all 
production profits are earned locally. Third, capital has perfect 
knowledge concerning the attributes of all jurisdictions, which 
includes the tax rate on capital and level of public goods and services 
provided. Fourth, there exist a large number of jurisdictions that take 
the after-tax return on capital as given. Fifth, there are no 
interjurisdictional externalities. Sixth, governments maximize the 
(known) social welfare of their jurisdiction. Oates summarizes this 
model, stating that “the invisible hand works in much the same way 
as in the private sector to channel policy decisions in individual 
jurisdictions into an efficient outcome from a national perspective.”24 
In sum, the Tiebout and interjurisdictional competition 
frameworks provide a definitive answer to the environmental 
federalism debate under certain assumptions. Failure of these 
assumptions, however, may reverse this conclusion. For example, 
Oates stresses the limitations of his earlier work, stating: “The 
problem is that these models make some strong 
assumptions. . . . [V]iolations of any of these conditions can lead to 
distorted outcomes.”25 Indeed, many theoretical models have extended 
the Oates and Schwab model by relaxing various assumptions, finding 
that decentralized environmental policy making with 
interjurisdictional competition may lead to environmental standards 
that are inefficiently stringent or lax.26 Thus, the central takeaway 
message from this lengthy theoretical literature is eloquently provided 
by Oates:  
The theoretical literature thus generates some diverse findings 
on this issue. There seem to be some basic efficiency-enhancing 
aspects of interjurisdictional competition, but there are clearly a 
 
22. Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Per G. Fredriksson, Regulatory Environmental 
Federalism, 2 Ann. Rev. Resource Econ. 319, 321 (2010) (“In this 
setup, it is not surprising that centralized environmental policy leads to 
the first-best outcome for the whole federation. . . . Oates & Schwab’s 
(1988) finding that decentralized policy leads to the first-best outcome is 
perhaps more surprising.”). 
23. See Oates & Schwab, supra note 21, at 335–38. 
24. Oates, supra note 16, at 1135. 
25. Id. at 1136. 
26. See Dijkstra & Fredriksson, supra note 22, for an excellent survey of 
this literature.  
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range of “imperfections” that can be the source of allocative 
distortions. The real issue here is the magnitude of these 
distortions. Are we dealing with minor deviations from efficient 
outcomes—or does such competition produce major welfare 
losses? The pure theory can’t help us much in answering this 
question.27 
The debate, then, over environmental federalism cannot be settled 
using theory alone. The range of possible theoretical outcomes can 
only be limited by an empirical understanding of the magnitudes of 
any violations of the various assumptions invoked in the Tiebout and 
interjursidictional competition frameworks. Surprisingly, a 
comprehensive review of what is known and unknown does not exist 
to the Author’s knowledge. The result is that the debate over 
environmental federalism focuses too much on anecdotal evidence and 
intuition and not enough on empirical facts. The remainder of this 
Article seeks to remedy this by assessing our current knowledge of the 
imperfections alluded to above by Oates. 
Prior to continuing, several comments are warranted. First, while 
violation of any of the assumptions noted above may cause 
decentralized environmental policy making to be inefficient, this does 
not imply that centralized policy making is efficient (or even less 
inefficient). Thus, interest lies in not just the validity of the prior 
assumptions, but also the contrast in social welfare under local versus 
central environmental authority because neither system is likely to 
yield the efficient outcome in practice.28 Such differences, to the 
extent possible, will be discussed in Part II. 
 
27. Oates, supra note 16, at 1136. 
28. The alternative to decentralized policy making need not be complete 
centralization. A third option based on regional policy making may be 
possible. See generally Oates, supra note 4, at 17–19 (“A systematic 
study of such regional efforts that makes use of a sensible categorization 
into typologies of environmental interaction (for example, unilateral 
versus reciprocal pollution flows) and collective decision-making 
institutions might well reveal what sorts of structures and policy 
measures can work effectively for the regional management of 
environmental quality.”); Terry Dinan & Natalie Tawil, Solving 
Environmental Problems with Regional Decision-making: A Case Study 
of Ground-Level Ozone, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 123, 123 (2003) (“Regional 
decision making may offer solutions in cases where the problem is less 
than national in scope, but clearly extends beyond individual state 
boundaries.”); Adler, supra note 9, at 141 (“Such interstate spillovers 
may constitute a regional problem, but this does not inherently justify 
national regulation. In such cases, regional solutions, such as the 
creation of regional entities or congressionally authorized interstate 
compacts, may be in order.”). In the interests of limiting the scope of 
the discussion, the distinction between regional and central policy 
making is ignored. 
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Second, neither environmental policy nor regulation are 
homogeneous concepts. There are important sources of heterogeneity 
across environmental issues (for example, air pollution, water 
pollution, hazardous waste disposal, and energy), across stages of 
environmental policy (for example, scientific research, standard 
setting, measurement, and enforcement), and across environmental 
instruments (for example, emissions taxes, cap-and-trade, subsidies, 
and command-and-control policies). In all likelihood there is no single 
answer to the question of optimal allocation of environmental 
authority across levels of government. Differences may arise across 
specific environmental issues or stages of the policy process. Moreover, 
certain policy instruments may not be available to all levels of 
governments. Such differences will also be emphasized when possible 
in the remainder of this Article.  
Finally, the quest to understand the optimal level of government 
at which to assign environmental authority depends on, among other 
things, one’s definition of optimal. Economists often equate optimality 
with efficiency, which requires the equating of marginal social costs 
and benefits in all locations. Others may wish to incorporate equity or 
political considerations into the notion of optimality.29 Still others 
may consider the optimal allocation of governmental authority as that 
which maximizes environmental quality.30 As evidenced by the 
theoretical discussion earlier in this Part, the structure of this Article 
is guided by the factors affecting the efficiency of policymaking in 
theoretical models. That said, the efficient outcome is generally 
unknown, making the “first-best policy . . . . typically imprac-
ticable.”31 Thus, empirical evidence regarding the impact of local 
versus central control is often expressed in terms of the level or 
variance of environmental quality or the resulting nature of the 
political process. Professor Adler reminds us, however, to bear in 
mind that stricter regulation is not always efficient.32  
29. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 
J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1997, at 43, 54 (“However one evaluates the 
economic efficiency performance of federal constitutions, it must be 
recognized that the federal institutions chosen will have important 
implications for political participation and the protection of individual 
rights and liberties, two other constitutional values central to past and 
current federalism debates.”). 
30. Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal 
Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 
67, 71 (2007) (“[I]t is common to suggest that more environmental 
regulation is better than less regulation . . . .”). 
31. H. Spencer Banzhaf & B. Andrew Chupp, Fiscal Federalism and 
Interjurisdictional Externalities: New Results and an Application to US 
Air Pollution, 96 J. Pub. Econ. 449, 449 (2012). 
32. See Adler, supra note 30, at 71 (“The optimal level of environmental 
regulation in a given context may be greater than current levels, but it 
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II. Environmental Federalism in Practice 
This Part discusses the empirical literature relating to several of 
the assumptions invoked in the Tiebout and interjursidictional 
competition frameworks. First, in Part II.A, the empirical literature 
on the mobility of capital and individuals is examined. Second, in 
Part II.B, preference heterogeneity is assessed. Third, in Part II.C, the 
importance of interjurisdictional externalities is evaluated. Fourth, in 
Part II.D, political economy issues are examined. Finally, in Part II.E, 
issues related to policy instruments are discussed.  
A. Resource Mobility 
The Tiebout framework has as its linchpin the perfect mobility of 
individuals.33 The interjurisdictional competition framework has its 
linchpin the perfect mobility of capital.34 Here, I review the empirical 
evidence on the mobility of these two resources, starting first with 
individual mobility. 
1. Population Mobility 
Efficiency in the Tiebout model is predicated upon the population 
to be perfectly mobile across jurisdictions in order for individuals to 
sort within communities that choose policies aligned with their 
preferences. Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak write: “The notion that one 
can pick up and move to a location that promises better opportunities 
has long been an important part of the American mystique.”35 Clearly, 
however, individuals are not perfectly mobile. Revesz states that 
 
may also be lower if the costs of a given level of regulation exceed the 
benefits.”). 
33. But see Oates, supra note 16, at 1124 (“In the limiting case, the Tiebout 
solution does indeed generate a first-best outcome that mimics the 
outcome in a competitive market. But the gains from decentralization, 
although typically enhanced by such mobility, are by no means wholly 
dependent upon them. In fact, if there were absolutely nothing mobile—
households, factors, or whatever—there would still exist, in general, 
gains from decentralization. The point here is simply that even in the 
absence of mobility, the efficient level of output of a ‘local’ public good, 
as determined by the Samuelson condition that the sum of the marginal 
rates of substitution equals marginal cost, will typically vary from one 
jurisdiction to another.”). 
34. See Brueckner, supra note 19, at 133–34 (“In contrast to the Tiebout 
tradition, the standard tax-competition model has immobile consumers 
and no demand heterogeneity. . . . [C]ompeting subnational governments 
pay for public goods with a tax on capital (i.e., business investment), 
which is mobile across jurisdictions but fixed in total supply.”). 
35. Raven Molloy, Christopher L. Smith & Abigail Wozniak, Internal 
Migration in the United States, 25 J. Econ. Persp., Summer 2011, at 
173, 173. 
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“much of the legal literature has dismissed as unrealistic the 
assumption of perfect mobility by individuals. There may, indeed, be 
substantial transaction costs in exiting one jurisdiction and moving to 
another, particularly in a world in which individuals have jobs and do 
not live solely on dividend income.”36 That said, how mobile are 
individuals? And, does mobility differ across socioeconomic groups? 
Evidence on residential mobility in the United States and other 
countries in the 1970s and 1980s is presented by Long.37 Defining 
mobility as simply changing residential address, he finds that the 
United States has the second highest one-year residential mobility 
rate at 17.5% (behind New Zealand) and the third highest five-year 
residential mobility rate at 46.4% (behind Canada and Australia) in 
the early 1980s among the handful of countries analyzed.38 However, 
changing residences within a jurisdiction is not the type of mobility 
envisioned in the Tiebout model. Upon further examination, Long 
reports that roughly sixty percent of one-year and five-year residential 
mobility is due to moves within the same county;39 roughly eighty 
percent is due to moves within the same state.40 Thus, very little 
internal migration crosses jurisdictional boundaries that might entail 
significant changes in the provision of environmental quality.  
Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak provide a more current, in-depth 
analysis of internal migration in the United States. The crux of their 
analysis points to an interesting puzzle: despite having one of the 
highest rates of internal migration in the world, internal migration in 
the United States has declined since roughly 1980.41 Specifically, five-
 
36. See Revesz, supra note 17, at 1237. 
37. Larry Long, Residential Mobility Differences Among Developed 
Countries, 14 Int’l Regional Sci. Rev. 133 (1991). 
38. Id. at 136 tbl.1. 
39. See id. at 143 tbl.4 (indicating that, in 1980–81, 10.4% of the 
population—or 60.4% of the moving population (17.2% of the total 
population)—was attributed to moving within a county for the one-year 
residential mobility interval and 25.1% of the population—or 54.0% of 
the moving population (46.5% of the total population)—was attributed 
to moving within a county for the five-year residential mobility 
interval).  
40. See id. (indicating that, in 1980–81, 13.8% of the population—or 80.2% 
of the moving population (17.2% of the total population)—was 
attributed to moving within a county for the one-year residential 
mobility interval and 34.9% of the population—or 75.1% of the moving 
population (46.5% of the total population)—was attributed to moving 
within a county for the five-year residential mobility interval). 
41. See Molloy, Smith & Wozniak, supra note 35, at 173–74 (“[I]nternal 
U.S. migration seems to have reached an inflection point around 
1980. . . . [T]he share of the population that had migrated between 
states trended higher during much of the twentieth century, with the 
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year, cross-state migration rates in the United States fell from 9.9% of 
the population in 1980 to 8.9% in 2000.42 Five-year, cross-county 
migration rates declined from 19.8% in 1980 to 18.6% in 2000.43 
Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak state:  
This decrease marks a noticeable departure from the longer-run 
trend, as migration shows a secular rise from 1900 to 
1990 . . . . Not only are migration rates lower in levels than at 
any point in the post-war period, they have also entered a 
period of continuous decline that is longer than any recorded in 
the twentieth century.44 
Beyond simply documenting rates of internal migration, several 
studies have assessed the determinants of migration and destination 
choice. Among different socioeconomic groups, the largest differences 
in migration rates appear across education levels and homeownership 
status. For example, Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak estimate the annual 
interstate migration rate for individuals with at least a college degree 
to be 2.1% over the period from 2001 to 2010 in comparison to only 
1.2% for high school graduates and 1.0% for high school dropouts.45 
Similarly, the migration rate for renters is 3.5%, but only 0.9% for 
homeowners.46 Surprisingly, there is little difference in migration rates 
by race or income status over this period.47  
Several studies also investigate the role of economic factors on 
migration decisions. Professors Barro and Sala-I-Martin document a 
statistically significant, but small, effect of per capita income 
differentials on interstate migration.48 Davies, Greenwood, and Li use 
a different statistical technique and obtain larger effects. Specifically, 
the authors find that one standard deviation increase in the ratio of  
exception of the Great Depression. However, migration rates have been 
falling in the past several decades . . . .”). 
42. Id. at 180 tbl.1. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 180–81 (citation omitted). 
45. Id. at 183 tbl.2.  
46. Id.  
47. See id. (finding a migration rate of 1.6% for individuals with an income 
status in the top fifty percent in comparison to 1.7% for individuals with 
an income status in the bottom fifty and finding a migration rate of 
1.8% for white individuals in comparison to 1.7% for black individuals).  
48. Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-I-Martin, Convergence Across States and 
Regions, 1991 Brookings Papers Econ. Activity, no. 1, 1991, at 
107, 132–33 (“Although the relation between the rate of in-migration 
and lagged per capita income is positive and highly significant (holding 
fixed our measure of amenities, population density, and some other 
variables), the magnitude of the relation is small.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·201 
Environmental Federalism 
1680 
the unemployment rate at a potential destination state to one’s 
current state reduces the likelihood of migration to that destination 
by about nineteen percent.49 Similarly, one standard deviation 
increase in the ratio of per capita income at a potential destination 
state to one’s current state increases the likelihood of migration to 
that destination by about sixteen percent.50 Finally, Professors Borjas, 
Bronars, and Trejo find that workers migrate to maximize their 
relative standard of living. In particular, high-skilled workers move to 
states where the return-to-skill rate is high (and, hence, income 
inequality is greater), while low-skilled workers move to states where 
the return-to-skill rate is low (and, hence, income inequality  
is lower).51 
To the Author’s knowledge, there is little empirical evidence on 
the role of environmental quality in explaining internal migration 
decisions. Barro and Sala-I-Martin explore interstate migration rates 
in the United States from 1900 to 1987. To proxy for environmental 
amenities, the authors include an independent variable measuring the 
average number of days requiring heating. This is admittedly an 
extremely crude proxy for environmental amenities. Nonetheless, the 
authors find it to be a meaningful determinant of net migration rates 
into particular states.52 Similarly, Professor Kahn explores the role of 
smog—measured as days per year exceeding the Clean Air Act’s one-
hour standard for ozone—on county-level population growth in 
California between 1980 and 1994. He finds that a county 
experiencing a ten-day decline in the number of “high ozone” days 
 
49. See Paul S. Davies, Michael J. Greenwood & Haizheng Li, A 
Conditional Logit Approach to U.S. State-to-State Migration, 41 J. 
Regional Sci. 337, 350 (2001) (“[A] one-standard deviation change in 
the destination-to-origin unemployment rate ratio reduces the 
probability of migration between 18 percent and 20 percent . . . .”). 
50. See id. (“[A] one-standard deviation change in the destination-to-origin 
per capita income ratio increases the probability of migration between 
16 percent and 17 percent . . . .”). 
51. George J. Borjas, Stephen G. Bronars & Stephen J. Trejo, Self-Selection 
and Internal Migration in the United States, 32 J. Urb. Econ. 159, 184 
(1992) (“Individuals are more likely to migrate the greater is the 
mismatch between their skill endowments and the returns paid to skills 
in their native state. Moreover, the direction and skill composition of 
internal migration flows seem to be guided by comparative advantage. 
Skilled workers tend to move to states with greater wage dispersion than 
their native state, whereas unskilled workers are more likely to move to 
states with less dispersion.”). 
52. See Barro & Sala-I-Martin, supra note 48, at 132 (“These results 
indicate that, all else being equal, people prefer warmer states.”). 
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over this time period registered a nearly 7.8% increase in population 
on average.53  
Professors Banzhaf and Walsh undertake a detailed analysis using 
more spatially disaggregate data than these prior studies.54 The 
authors use data from California over the period from 1990 to 2000. 
The authors divide urban areas of the state into mutually exclusive 
half-mile diameter circles. They then assess the relationship that 
changes in pollution have with changes in population and mean 
household income over this period.55 Toxicity-weighted air emissions 
from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) are used as the measure of 
pollution. The results support the role of environmental amenities in 
household location decisions. Specifically, locations with the average 
level of emissions in 1990, as opposed to no emissions in 1990, 
experienced about a twelve percent reduction in the population 
growth rate between 1990 and 2000.56 The average location 
experiencing an increase in emissions over the time period suffered a 
6.9% reduction in the population growth rate.57 The average location 
experiencing a decline in emissions witnessed a 6.3% increase in the 
population growth rate.58 
Lastly, Professor Konisky, in tangentially related research, finds 
that better educated individuals are more likely to favor federal 
 
53. Matthew E. Kahn, Smog Reduction’s Impact on California County 
Growth, 40 J. Regional Sci. 565, 570 (2000) (“A county that 
experienced a 10-day reduction in high ozone days between 1980 and 
1994 grew by 7.8 percent more than a county whose ozone level 
remained unchanged.”). 
54. H. Spencer Banzhaf & Randall P. Walsh, Do People Vote with Their 
Feet? An Empirical Test of Tiebout’s Mechanism, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. 
843, 850 (2008) (“Census tracts may be too aggregate a unit . . . . For 
these reasons, we take a different approach to neighborhood definitions. 
We define neighborhoods as a set of half-mile-diameter circles . . . .”). 
55. See id. at 849 (“First, we identify a set of spatially delineated 
communities. Second, we construct demographic composition measures 
for each community for 1990 and 2000. Finally, for each community we 
construct measures of the toxicity-weighted level of exposure to air 
pollution in 1990 and 2000 based on data from the Toxics Release 
Inventory of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).”). 
56. See id. at 858 (“Focusing on the percentage change model, on average, 
baseline exposure to TRI emissions is associated with relative population 
declines that range from 10 to 16 percent, depending on the model.”). 
57. See id. (“Likewise, the appearance of new toxic emissions in a previously 
untreated neighborhood is associated with population declines between 5 
and 9 percent.”). 
58. See id. (“Finally, the model predicts consistent responses in the opposite 
direction for communities that lose exposure. On average, these 
communities are predicted to experience population gains of 5 to 7 
percent.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·201 
Environmental Federalism 
1682 
control over most environmental issues, including local issues such as 
protecting community drinking water.59 If the higher mobility rates of 
the better educated documented by Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak are 
related to environmental issues, one might expect the reverse to  
be true.  
In sum, labor mobility is relatively high in the United States 
compared to many other developed countries, and there exists some 
evidence that location decisions are impacted by environmental 
amenities at a very spatially disaggregate level. But, mobility is on a 
“historically unprecedented” downward trajectory in the United 
States.60 Whether this low (and declining) mobility invalidates the 
Tiebout assumption, or simply reflects a population close to 
equilibrium where most individuals are currently residing in 
communities that maximize their utility is not clear. Moreover, 
whether the “threat” of migration exists and is sufficient to satisfy the 
assumptions of the Tiebout model is equally unclear.61 
However, three facts work against the Tiebout model. First, 
migration patterns appear to be strongly related to employment, not 
the provision of public goods. Second, the survey evidence provided in 
Konisky indicates that more mobile segments of the population are 
more likely to favor federal authority over even local environmental 
issues. Finally, the fact that mobility rates are significantly lower for 
the less educated runs the risk that jurisdictions do not compete for 
residents of this type, but instead focus on the competition for more 
mobile, educated residents. If so, the Tiebout model would predict 
that the preferences of lower educated residents will be ignored. 
Provision of even purely local goods, such as drinking water, may not 
reflect the preferences of all residents. Bednar states: “If only a 
categorical portion of the population is immobile—the poor or ethnic 
minorities—then outcomes are even worse; governments compete for 
the wealthiest and are free to ignore these minority categories.”62  
59. David Konisky, Public Preferences for Environmental Policy 
Responsibility, 41 Publius: J. Federalism 76, 93 (2010) (“The 
parameter estimates on the education variable range from about 0.15 to 
0.40, which translates, on average, to a difference in the predicted 
probability of an individual without a high school degree choosing the 
federal government relative to someone with a post-graduate degree of 
about 0.17.”). 
60. Molloy, Smith & Wozniak, supra note 35, at 194. 
61. The threat of migration is analogous to the notion of contestable 
markets. In that case, a market with few firms may achieve the 
competitive equilibrium if the threat of entry exists due to: (1) a lack of 
entry and exit barriers; (2) no sunk costs; and (3) complete access to the 
same technology by both incumbents and new entrants. See, e.g., 
William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of 
Industry Structure, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 1, 3–4 (1982). 
62. Bednar, supra note 1, at 274. 
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2. Capital Mobility 
The empirical literature on capital mobility is much more 
extensive. Not only are there a number of studies assessing the impact 
of taxation on the location of industrial activity, but there are many 
studies focused solely on the impact of environmental regulation on 
the location of industrial activity. In the interest of relative brevity, 
this Article focuses solely on the latter and starts with the 1995 
survey article by Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins.63 The authors 
survey the literature at the time on the effects of the early period of 
environmental regulation in the United States (post-1970) on country-
level competitiveness.64 To measure competitiveness, the authors focus 
on empirical studies examining trade patterns, both generally and 
specifically in pollution-intensive industries, domestic firm location 
decisions, and foreign direct investment (FDI).65 Jaffe, Peterson, 
Portney, and Stavins summarize the literature, concluding:  
Overall, there is relatively little evidence to support the 
hypothesis that environmental regulations have had a large 
adverse effect on competitiveness, however that elusive term is 
defined. . . . [S]tudies attempting to measure the effect of 
environmental regulation on net exports, overall trade flows, 
and plant-location decisions have produced estimates that are 
either small, statistically insignificant, or not robust to tests of 
model specification.66  
Surveying the literature at roughly the same time, Levinson similarly 
notes that “the empirical literature suggests that . . . economic 
activity does not respond significantly to the different taxes and 
regulations in competing jurisdictions.”67 
However, there are a number of statistical problems that plague 
these early empirical studies. In their concluding remarks, Jaffe, 
Peterson, Portney, and Stavins discuss the issue of measuring 
 
63. Adam B. Jaffe, Steven R. Peterson, Paul R. Portney & Robert N. 
Stavins, Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. 
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. Econ. 
Literature 132 (1995). 
64. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a 
“Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 Hastings L.J. 271 (1997) 
(surveying the legal literature). 
65. See Jaffee, Peterson, Portney & Stavins, supra note 63, at 137. 
66. Id. at 157–58. 
67. Arik Levinson, NIMBY Taxes Matter: The Case of State Hazardous 
Waste Disposal Taxes, 74 J. Pub. Econ. 31, 32 (1999). 
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environmental stringency in practice.68 Environmental regulation is a 
complex concept which does not lend itself to precise measurement. 
Regulations differ across pollutants and depend not just on legislation 
(de jure regulation) but also enforcement (de facto regulation). 
Reliance on poor proxies for environmental regulation—referred to as 
measurement error in the econometric literature—might explain the 
lack of meaningful effects found in these early studies. A second 
problem with this early literature is that the results lacked a 
convincing causal interpretation. The authors note: “[T]he choice of a 
new plant location is obviously a complex one. . . . Hence, isolating 
the effect of environmental regulations on the decision will inevitably 
be difficult.”69 In particular, the choice of environmental stringency in 
a particular jurisdiction may be endogenous to the level (or expected 
level) of economic activity, or may be correlated with other location-
specific attributes that determine the location of economic activity 
but are unobserved by the researcher. 
The empirical literature beginning in the late 1990s addresses 
these criticisms. As noted by Professors Jeppesen, List, and Folmer, 
this “second wave” of studies has consistently found meaningful, 
detrimental effects of environmental regulation on industrial activity.70 
Professors Brunnermeier and Levinson conclude:  
The early literature based on cross-sectional analyses typically 
tended to find that environmental regulations had an 
insignificant effect on firm location decisions. However, several 
recent studies that use panel data to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, or instruments to control for endogeneity, do find 
statistically significant pollution haven effects of reasonable 
magnitude. Furthermore, it does not appear to matter whether 
these studies look across countries, industries, states, or 
counties, or whether they examine plant location, investment, or 
international trade patterns.71 
 
68. See Jaffee, Peterson, Portney & Stavins, supra note 63, at 158 
(“[E]xisting data are severely limited in their ability to measure the 
relative stringency of environmental regulation . . . .”). 
69. Id. at 146. 
70. Tim Jeppesen, John A. List & Henk Folmer, Environmental Regulations 
and New Plant Location Decisions: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis, 42 
J. Regional Sci. 19, 23–24 (2002) (“Papers in the second research 
wave . . . typically find much stronger evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that environmental regulations affect the allocation of new 
firms.”). 
71. Smita B. Brunnermeier & Arik Levinson, Examining the Evidence on 
Environmental Regulations and Industry Location, 13 J. Env’t & Dev. 
6, 37–38 (2004). 
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One branch of this second wave of studies uses the spatial and 
temporal variation in U.S. county-level environmental regulation 
induced by the Clean Air Act72 (CAA) to address the question of 
capital mobility. Specifically, beginning in 1972, every U.S. county is 
designated as either in attainment or out of attainment 
(nonattainment) of the federally designated standard for each of the 
criteria air pollutants established under the statute.73 Counties that 
are in nonattainment are subject to more stringent regulation.74 Thus, 
nonattainment status is synonymous with greater regulatory 
stringency. 
Professor Henderson uses data on the ozone attainment status of 
urban counties over the period from 1977 to 1987, along with data on 
the number of establishments in each county during each year from 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns, to examine the 
effects of the more stringent regulations imposed in nonattainment 
counties.75 He focuses on five pollution-intensive manufacturing 
industries: industrial organic chemicals, petroleum refining, 
miscellaneous plastics, plastic materials and synthetics, and blast 
furnace and primary steel. The results indicate that counties in 
attainment over the prior three years contain seven to ten percent 
more establishments than other counties.76   
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (2006). 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(c)–(d). 
74. See, e.g., Michael Greenstone, The Impacts of Environmental 
Regulations on Industrial Activity: Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 
Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures, 110 
Journal Pol. Econ. 1175, 1176–77 (“The Clean Air Act, originally 
passed in 1963 and amended in 1970, 1977, and 1990, is one of the most 
significant federal interventions into the market in the postwar period. 
Following the passage of the 1970 amendments, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) established separate national ambient air 
quality standards—a minimum level of air quality that all counties are 
required to meet—for four criteria pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), 
tropospheric ozone (O3), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and total suspended 
particulates (TSPs). As a part of this legislation, every U.S. county 
receives separate nonattainment or attainment designations for each of 
the four pollutants annually. The nonattainment designation is reserved 
for counties whose air contains concentrations of a pollutant that exceed 
the relevant federal standard. Emitters of the regulated pollutant in 
nonattainment counties are subject to stricter regulatory oversight than 
emitters in attainment counties. Nonpolluters are free from regulation in 
both categories of counties.”). 
75. See J. Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulation, 86 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 789, 811 (1996). 
76. See id. at 802 (“In summary, a county being in nonattainment for heavy 
volatile organic compound emitters discourages location there. A switch 
to a clean ozone record increases the number of plants in the county by 
about 8 percent.”). 
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In a subsequent study, Professor Henderson revisits the same data 
using a different statistical methodology and focusing on a binary 
indicator of the presence of at least one of the pollution-intensive 
establishments in a county during a given year.77 He finds that the 
probability of a given industry being located in a county increases by 
at least fourteen percent in four of the five industries considered after 
a county switches from nonattainment to attainment.78 
Becker and Henderson continue this line of inquiry, using plant-
level data over the period from 1963 to 1992 for the industrial organic 
chemicals, miscellaneous plastic products, metal cans and barrels, and 
the wood furniture sectors.79 The data used by Becker and Henderson 
came from the Longitudinal Research Database, administered by the 
Center for Economic Studies of the U.S. Census Bureau. The results 
are in line with the prior studies; nonattainment status reduces the 
expected number of new plant births by twenty-six to forty-five 
percent.80 However, the authors find that new plants locating in 
nonattainment counties are initially larger in size (relative to new 
plants locating in attainment areas). This size discrepancy disappears 
after roughly ten years.81 
Greenstone builds on this research by examining approximately 
.75 million plant-level observations over the period from 1967 to 1987, 
obtained from the Census of Manufactures, to assess the separate 
impacts of carbon monoxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide, and total 
suspended particulate nonattainment status across all counties in the 
United States.82 With such rich data, the author is able to identify the  
77. See Vernon Henderson, The Impact of Air Quality Regulation on 
Industrial Location, 45 Annals Econ. & Stat. 123, 128–29 (1997) 
(addressing “the discrete choice problem of whether the county has the 
industry or not”). 
78. See id. at 132 (“Specifically, for each industry for the base, I take a 
county in non-attainment status and assign it a base probability of 
having the industry in year t of 0.25. I then calculate the positive effect 
of moving to attainment status. . . . The effects are very large. 
Probabilities rise from 0.25 to anywhere from 0.39 to 0.71. This would 
suggest that attainment status is a key variable in firm location 
decisions.” (citation omitted)). 
79. Randy Becker & Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulations 
on Polluting Industries, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 379, 386–88 (2000). 
80. Id. at 397 (“Nonattainment status in the regulatory era reduces the 
expected number of births in a county by 26–45 percent, depending on 
the industry, with the largest impact occurring for the industry with the 
largest plant sizes, industrial organic chemicals.”). 
81. See id. at 411 (“New plants . . . are significantly larger in 
nonattainment counties than in attainment counties, by 25–69 percent. 
That effect then diminishes with age, so that plants 10+ years have a 
similar size in nonattainment counties.”). 
82. See Greenstone, supra note 74, at 1183–84. 
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effect of nonattainment status on plants in sectors deemed to be high 
emitters of each of the four criteria pollutants using only the temporal 
variation within plants, controlling for industry-level and county-level 
unobserved attributes in an unrestricted way. The results indicate 
that over the period from 1972 to 1987, nonattainment counties 
(relative to in attainment counties) lost roughly 590,000 jobs, $37 
billion in capital stock, and $75 billion in output.83 
In a series of papers by Professor List and co-authors, the impacts 
of ozone nonattainment status on county-level industrial activity in 
New York State are examined over the period from 1980 to 1990. 
Annual data on new plant births by domestic and foreign firms, as 
well as plant relocations, are provided by the Industrial Migration 
File maintained by the New York State Department of Economic 
Development.84 List, McHone, and Millimet focus on plant relocations 
and find that being in nonattainment costs a county roughly 0.50 
fewer relocating plants in pollution-intensive sectors per year relative 
to being in attainment.85 Given that the average county in the sample 
only receives about 0.2 relocating plants per year, this represents a 
sizeable decrease. List, Millimet, McHone, and Fredriksson analyze 
new plant births using similar statistical techniques. Here, the authors 
find even larger effects: nonattainment counties lose out on 
approximately one new pollution-intensive plant per year relative to 
counties in attainment.86 The average county in the sample obtains 
0.4 new plant births per year. Finally, List, McHone, and Millimet 
revisit the data on new plant births, distinguishing between new plant 
births by foreign and domestic firms. The authors find that the prior 
deterrent effects of nonattainment status on new plant births is driven 
entirely by domestically owned plants; foreign-owned plants are 
unresponsive to spatial variation in environmental regulatory costs 
due to differences in ozone attainment status.87  
 
83. See id. at 1178. 
84. John A. List, Daniel L. Millimet, Per G. Fredriksson & W. Warren 
McHone, Effects of Environmental Regulations on Manufacturing Plant 
Births: Evidence from a Propensity Score Matching Estimator, 85 Rev. 
Econ. & Stat. 944, 945 (2003). 
85. John A. List, W. Warren McHone & Daniel L. Millimet, Effects of Air 
Quality Regulation on the Destination Choice of Relocating Plants, 55 
Oxford Econ. Papers 657, 674 (2003) (“[E]stimates suggest that 
approximately 0.50 fewer plants per year relocate in a county that is 
[out of attainment].”). 
86. See List, Millimet, Fredriksson & McHone, supra note 84, at 948 (“[A]n 
estimated ‘cost’ of being out of attainment . . . is between 0.7 and 1.3 
new plants per year.”). 
87. John A. List, W. Warren McHone & Daniel L. Millimet, Effects of 
Environmental Regulation on Foreign and Domestic Plant Births: Is 
There a Home Field Advantage?, 56 J. Urb. Econ. 303, 324 (2004) 
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The other branch of this second wave of the empirical literature 
on the effects of environmental regulation on the location of industrial 
activity analyzes patterns of international trade and FDI (the so-
called pollution haven hypothesis). The criticisms of the early 
literature are particularly worrisome when examining the effects of 
cross-country differences in environmental regulation. First, one needs 
a consistent measure of environmental regulation across multiple 
countries. Second, one needs extensive data on country (or industry) 
characteristics; otherwise any association between environmental 
stringency and the patterns of global trade or investment may simply 
reflect unobserved attributes of countries (or industries) correlated 
with both regulation and the location of industrial activity. The 
traditional econometric approach used to overcome measurement error 
in the proxy for environmental regulation and unobserved, country-
level heterogeneity is the method of instrumental variables. While not 
all studies employing instrumental variables are necessarily sound 
(due to the use of weak or potentially invalid instruments), this 
Article focuses only on studies that employ this technique as the 
alternative—such as cross-sectional or fixed-effects estimation—
because this approach is not likely to produce causal estimates of the 
impacts of environmental regulation in this Article’s author’s view 
(due to the requirement that all independent variables in such models 
be strictly exogenous).  
The first set of studies focus on patterns of FDI. Professors Xing 
and Kolstad assess the pattern on U.S. outbound FDI in six 
manufacturing sectors across twenty-two host countries using data 
from 1985 and 1990.88 As a proxy for environmental regulation, the 
authors utilize sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions. The authors find more 
lax regulation (as measured by higher SO2 emissions) leads to greater 
investment in the United States within two pollution-intensive 
industries: chemicals and primary metals.89 There is no meaningful 
effect for the other, less pollution-intensive, sectors considered. 
Professors Fredriksson, List, and Millimet examine the impact of 
environmental stringency on U.S. inbound FDI across the forty-eight 
contiguous states for the period from 1977 to 1986.90 To measure 
 
(“[W]e find that domestic plants are responsive to environmental 
standards whereas foreign plants are not.”). 
88. See Yuquing Xing & Charles D. Kolstad, Do Lax Environmental 
Regulations Attract Foreign Investment?, 21 Envtl. & Resource 
Econ. 1, 11–12 (2002). 
89. See id. at 15 (“In general, lax environmental policy tends to attract 
more capital inflow from the US for pollution intensive industries.”). 
90. See Per G. Fredriksson, John A. List & Daniel L. Millimet, 
Bureaucratic Corruption, Environmental Policy and Inbound US FDI: 
Theory and Evidence, 87 J. Pub. Econ. 1407, 1413–19 (2003). 
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environmental regulation, the authors utilize an index based on the 
ratio of actual pollution abatement expenditures incurred by plants 
located in the state to the predicted level of expenditures based on the 
state’s industrial composition. The results indicate a meaningful 
deleterious effect of stringency on inbound FDI. For example, the 
effect of one standard deviation in stringency in California in 1984 is 
predicted to lower employment in the foreign-owned chemical plants 
by six percent—or 2500 jobs.91 
Professors Cole and Elliott analyze the patterns of U.S. outbound 
FDI in Brazil and Mexico across thirty-one and thirty-six industries 
respectively from 1989–1994.92 The authors’ goal is to disentangle the 
effects of environmental regulatory costs—measured by industry-level 
pollution abatement costs per unit of value added—on firm behavior 
from the effects of endowments of physical capital. Specifically, the 
authors contend that since many pollution-intensive sectors are also 
capital-intensive, the benefit to firms from more lax environmental 
standards in less developed countries may be offset by lower levels of 
physical capital in these same countries.93 Brazil and Mexico, the 
authors argue, are relatively well endowed with physical capital but 
have lax environmental standards, thus making it more likely that 
investment in these countries will be more sensitive to environmental 
costs.94 Indeed, the authors find evidence supporting the claim that 
sectors experiencing relatively high environmental regulatory costs in 
the United States do invest more in each country. 
Cole and Fredriksson utilize data on inbound FDI to thirteen 
countries that are members of Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OCED) and twenty less developed 
countries over the period from 1982 to 1992.95 The proxy variable for 
environmental regulation is the allowable lead content in gasoline. 
The results point to a sizeable, deleterious effect of environmental 
regulation on the amount of inbound FDI enjoyed by a country. For 
example, roughly one standard deviation increase in the authors’ 
measure of regulation leads to approximately a 0.6 standard deviation 
reduction in a country’s stock of FDI.96  
91. See id. at 1424. 
92. See Matthew A. Cole & Robert J.R. Elliott, FDI and the Capital 
Intensity of “Dirty” Sectors: A Missing Piece of the Pollution Haven 
Puzzle, 9 Rev. Dev. Econ. 530, 533–36 (2005). 
93. See id. at 535. 
94. See id. (“Brazil and Mexico are two developing countries with 
reasonably high capital-labor ratios, yet with reasonably low levels of 
environmental regulations.”). 
95. See Matthew A. Cole & Per G. Fredriksson, Institutionalized Pollution 
Havens, 68 Ecological Econ. 1239, 1245–46 (2009). 
96. Id. at 1251. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·201 
Environmental Federalism 
1690 
Professor Kellenberg focuses on effects of country-level 
environmental stringency on the value added of majority-owned U.S. 
affiliates in fifty countries across nine industries over the period from 
1999 to 2003.97 To measure environmental policy, Kellenberg uses 
data from the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) on the 
stringency and enforcement of environmental regulations. The GCR 
creates separate indices related to stringency and enforcement based 
on survey responses elicited from executives.98 The results point to a 
meaningful effect of environmental regulation on the location of 
production abroad by majority-owned U.S. affiliates. Specifically, for 
the top quintile of countries in terms of the increase in economic 
activity by majority-owned U.S. affiliates over the sample period, 
8.6% of this increase is attributable to more lax environmental 
policies in these countries.99 
Finally, Professors Millimet and Roy analyze the pattern of 
inbound FDI across the forty-eight contiguous U.S. states from 1977 
to 1986 and 1988 to 1994 using recently developed econometric 
techniques designed for situations where valid instrumental variables 
are difficult to envision.100 The measure of state-level environmental 
regulation is identical to that used by Fredriksson, List, and 
Millimet.101 The authors find an adverse impact of environmental 
regulation on the amount of FDI locating in a state for the pollution-
intensive chemical sector, but no effect on the level of FDI for 
manufacturing as a whole.102  
The second set of studies focus on patterns of international trade. 
Cole and Elliot examine the impact of environmental regulation on 
the net exports of sixty countries in four pollution-intensive sectors in 
1995.103 The sectors studied include iron and steel, chemicals, pulp  
97. See Derek K. Kellenberg, An Empirical Investigation of the Pollution 
Haven Effect with Strategic Environment and Trade Policy, 78 J. of 
Int’l Econ. 242, 244–46 (2009). 
98. Id. 
99. See id. at 250 (“Put differently, approximately 8.6% of U.S. affiliate 
value added growth by the top 20th percentile countries can be 
attributed to falling environmental policy.”). 
100. See Daniel L. Millimet & Jayjit Roy, Three New Empirical Tests of the 
Pollution Haven Hypothesis When Environmental Regulation Is 
Endogenous 7–9 (Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Discussion 
Paper Series No. 5911, 2011). 
101. See Fredriksson, List & Millimet, supra note 90, at 1414. 
102. See Millimet & Roy, supra note 100, at 22 (“[W]e consistently 
find . . . a negative and economically significant impact of own 
environmental stringency on inbound FDI in the chemical sector.”). 
103. Matthew A. Cole & Robert J.R. Elliott, Do Environmental Regulations 
Influence Trade Patterns? Testing Old and New Trade Theories, 26 
World Econ. 1163, 1166–67 (2003). 
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and paper, and non-ferrous metals. Two measures of environmental 
stringency are employed. The first is an index based on country 
reports concerning environmental policies and enforcement compiled 
under United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
guidelines. The second is a proxy variable computed using information 
on the energy intensity of production. The authors find no effects of 
environmental stringency on net exports, but they do find effects on 
the composition of trade: stricter regulation leads to a greater fraction 
of trade that is inter-industry.104 
Several studies utilize U.S. industry-level measures of 
environmental costs based on pollution abatement expenditures to 
assess the impact of regulation on industry-level measures of U.S. 
imports or exports. Professors Ederington and Minier analyze data on 
the net imports of 374 U.S. industries over the period of 1978, 1980 to 
1986, and 1988 to 1992.105 The authors find extremely large effects of 
environmental costs on net imports. Specifically, they find that a one 
percent increase in pollution abatement costs results in a thirty 
percent increase in net imports scaled by the total value of U.S. 
shipments in the industry.106 Similarly, Cole, Elliott, and Shimamoto 
analyze the effect of environmental costs on U.S. net exports across 
ninety-six industries over the same time period.107 The authors also 
control for the human and physical capital intensity of sectors, finding 
a detrimental effect of environmental costs on net exports. However, 
the magnitude of the effect is much smaller than that attributable to 
human or physical capital considerations.108 
 
104. See id. at 1179 (“[W]e found no evidence to suggest that either of our 
two measures of environmental regulations were statistically significant 
determinants of ‘dirty’ net exports. . . . Our results suggest that the 
shares of trade that are intra- and inter-industry are indeed influenced 
by environmental regulation differentials between two countries.”). 
105. Josh Ederington & Jenny Minier, Is Environmental Policy a Secondary 
Trade Barrier? An Empirical Analysis, 36 Can. J. Econ. 137, 142–43, 
150 app.A (2003). 
106. See id. at 146 (“[W]e estimate that an industry with pollution 
abatement costs 1 percentage point higher than otherwise identical 
industries will have a net import ratio over 30 percentage points 
higher . . . .”). 
107. Matthew A. Cole, Robert J.R. Elliott & Kenichi Shimamoto, Why the 
Grass Is Not Always Greener: The Competing Effects of Environmental 
Regulations and Factor Intensities on US Specialization, 54 
Ecological Econ. 95 (2005). 
108. See id. at 107 (“We illustrate in a variety of ways that pollution 
intensive industries are typically more intensive in the use of physical 
and human capital than cleaner industries. These factor intensities 
appear to be important determinants of US specialization patterns, 
suggesting that factor intensities and environmental regulations have a 
competing influence on revealed comparative advantage.”). 
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Finally, Professors Levinson and Taylor examine U.S. net imports 
from Mexico and Canada across 132 industries over the period from 
1977 to 1986.109 The authors also find a large, adverse effect of 
environmental costs on domestic production. For example, net 
imports from Canada increased by $601 million for the average 
industry in the sample over this period; $79 million of this increase is 
attributable to the rise in pollution abatement costs.110 Among the 
twenty industries in the U.S. that experienced the largest rise in 
pollution abatement costs, the numbers are $595 million and $453 
million, respectively.111 
The final two studies utilize data across several countries. 
Professors Jug and Mirza analyze the import patterns of twelve 
countries in the EU15 and export patterns of nineteen countries from 
the EU15, central Europe, and eastern Europe across nine industries 
over the period from 1996 to 1999.112 Environmental regulation is 
measured using data from the Eurostat Environmental Expenditures 
and Environmental Taxes database on total current expenditures 
related to environmental protection activities for all manufacturing. 
The results indicate a meaningful, negative effect of environmental 
stringency on domestic production, with results of greater magnitude 
for eastern Europe.113 
Professors Mulatu, Gerlagh, Rigby, and Wossink utilize data on 
sixteen industries across thirteen countries to assess the role of 
environmental regulation on the share of production in each industry 
that occurs in each country. The objective is to determine whether 
countries with relatively less stringent regulation are responsible for a 
greater share of production in pollution-intensive sectors over the 
period from 1990 to 1994. The country-level measure of regulation is 
given by the Environmental Sustainability Index (collected in 2001) 
developed by the World Economic forum, Yale Center for 
Environmental Law, and Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network at Columbia University. As with the prior 
 
109. Arik Levinson & M. Scott Taylor, Unmasking the Pollution Haven 
Effect, 49 Int’l Econ. Rev. 223, 237–40 (2008). 
110. See id. at 246, 252 (calculating the net import increase from the average 
increase in trade volume as compared to the abatement costs). 
111. See id. at 252. 
112. Jerneja Jug & Daniel Mirza, Environmental Regulations in Gravity 
Equations: Evidence from Europe, 28 World Econ. 1591, 1600–03 
(2005). 
113. See id. at 1612 (“[E]nvironmental stringency matters more for Eastern 
European exporters, since EU importers might be more sensitive to 
developing countries’ average lower product quality and lack of varieties 
provided.”). 
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studies, the findings point to significantly greater domestic production 
in pollution-intensive industries in countries with lax regulation.114 
In sum, second generation studies—utilizing better data to 
identify the causal effect of environmental policy—have consistently 
documented a meaningful effect of environmental stringency on the 
location of economic activity. That said, these findings must be 
interpreted carefully. First, environmental costs are a small fraction of 
the total production costs for most industrial sectors.115 Thus, the 
effects documented in the literature typically apply to only the most 
pollution-intensive industries. For the vast majority of industries, 
environmental costs are a small fraction of overall costs and location 
decisions are dominated by other factors. For example, Henderson and 
Millimet allow for heterogeneous effects of more stringent 
environmental policy on the amount of foreign investment and find 
the effects to be negative for some locations and positive for others.116 
Consistent with this finding, Henderson and Millimet had previously 
found no overall effect of environmental stringency on the Gross State 
Product of U.S. states.117  
Second, the effects estimated by econometric models are ceteris 
paribus effects. In other words, they indicate the impact of more 
stringent environment regulation with “other things being equal” or 
with the assumption that all other variables are being held 
constant.118 In practice, other important determinants of the location 
of economic activity are not held fixed such as a location’s endowment 
of physical and human capital. This fact is highlighted in several 
analyses. Studies by Ederington, Levinson, and Minier and Levinson 
show that the rate of increase in total U.S. imports has risen faster 
over the past few decades than the rate of imports of pollution-
 
114. See id. at 475 (“[I]ncreased environmental regulatory laxity does not 
result in an increased share of the ‘average’ industry. However, when the 
most polluting, rather than the average, industry is considered, 
increased environmental regulatory laxity does result in a higher 
proportion of this dirty industry locating there.”). 
115. See Jaffee, Peterson, Portney & Stavins, supra note 63, at 158 (“[F]or 
all but the most heavily regulated industries, the cost of complying with 
federal environmental regulation is a relatively small fraction of total 
cost of production.”). 
116. Daniel J. Henderson & Daniel L. Millimet, Pollution Abatement Costs 
and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to U.S. States: A Nonparametric 
Reassessment, 89 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 178, 179 (2007). 
117. Daniel J. Henderson & Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental Regulation 
and US State-Level Production, 87 Econ. Letters 47, 52 (2005) 
(“[T]he lack of an observed association between the stringency of 
environmental regulation and state-level output is robust.”). 
118. Black’s Law Dictionary 260 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “ceteris 
paribus”).  
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intensive goods.119 As such, the pollution content of U.S. imports has 
fallen over a period where U.S. regulatory stringency has increased 
markedly.120 Professors Grether, Mathys, and de Melo analyze the 
pollution content of imports across forty-eight countries and find that 
environmental standards play a small role in the overall pattern of 
trade.121 In this vein, Cole and Elliott conclude: “We do not suggest 
that pollution havens are widespread.”122  
Finally, while the studies reviewed in this Part make use of 
instrumental-variables or fixed-effects strategies in an attempt to 
isolate the causal effect of environmental regulation, not all 
identification strategies are convincing.123 Accordingly, readers should 
be cognizant that simply because researchers employ panel-data-fixed-
effects or instrumental-variables methods does not mean that such 
strategies produce credible inferences. 
B. Preference Heterogeneity  
The Tiebout framework relies on heterogeneous individuals 
sorting themselves across communities offering different combinations 
of taxes and public goods. In equilibrium, the policies of each 
community will reflect the preferences of its homogeneous residents. 
The literature on environmental federalism, and fiscal federalism more 
generally, has long touted the ability of communities to synchronize 
policy choices with individual preferences as the primary advantage of 
decentralized policy making. Gordon states: “One of the key 
advantages of decentralization is the resulting diversity of policies.”124  
119. See, e.g., Josh Ederington, Arik Levinson & Jenny Minier, Trade 
Liberalization and Pollution Havens, 4 Advances Econ. Analysis & 
Pol’y 1, 6 fig.1B (2004) (demonstrating an increase in U.S. imports 
overall as compared to the import of pollution-intensive products). 
120. Arik Levinson, Offshoring Pollution: Is the United States Increasingly 
Importing Polluting Goods?, 4 Rev. Envtl. Econ. & Pol’y 63, 79 
(2010) (“Today the United States imports proportionally more clean 
goods and proportionally fewer polluting goods than was the case 30 
years ago. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the green shift in imports is 
even larger than the green shift in domestic production. In other words, 
the analysis here finds that the United States has not been offshoring 
pollution.”). 
121. Jean-Marie Grether, Nicole Andréa Mathys & Jaime de Melo, 
Unravelling the Worldwide Pollution Haven Effect, 21 J. Int’l Trade 
& Econ. Dev. 131, 131 (2012) (“[E]conometric estimates suggest a 
significant pollution haven effect . . . . On a global scale, because the 
bulk of trade is intra-regional with a high North-North share, these 
effects are small relative to the ‘deep’ determinants of worldwide PCI 
[pollution content of imports].”). 
122. Cole & Elliott, supra note 92, at 541. 
123. E.g., Millimet & Roy, supra note 100, at 4–6. 
124. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 582. 
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Oates writes: “The hope is that state and local governments, being 
closer to the people, will be more responsive to the particular 
preferences of their constituencies . . . .”125 Adler asserts that 
“localized control of environmental policy will produce environmental 
measures that are more likely to reflect the preferences and needs of 
those who will be most affected by them.”126  
In practice, the advantages to decentralized policy making depend 
on three factors: (1) the extent of preference heterogeneity in the 
population; (2) the degree to which individuals act on such 
preferences to sort themselves into homogeneous communities; and (3) 
the ability of local governments to better respond to community 
preferences than the central government. I discuss the empirical 
evidence on each in turn. 
For the purposes of evaluating the benefits of decentralization, 
empirical evidence on the extent of heterogeneous preferences over 
environmental issues is scant. Several papers utilize survey or voting 
data to examine associations between socioeconomic characteristics 
and preferences. Elliott, Seldon, and Regens use data from the 
General Social Survey, which is administered by the U.S. National 
Opinion Research Center, to analyze public attitudes toward 
environmental spending over the periods from 1974 to 1978, 1980, and 
1982 to 1991.127 The authors find that liberalism, lower age, being 
female, being nonwhite, urban status, education, and income are 
positively associated with preferences for environmental spending.128 
However, one is not able to discern how much overall variation in 
preferences exists, nor how much of this variation is explained by 
these attributes.  
Additional analyses have been undertaken using individual-level, 
cross-country data. Professors Israel and Levinson utilize data 
spanning thirty-three countries from the World Values Survey during 
the mid-1990s.129 Consistent with the prior study, the authors find 
that lower age, being female, education, and income are positively 
associated with willingness to pay for environmental improvements.130 
However, the vast majority of the variation in willingness to pay  
125. See Oates, supra note 16, at 1120. 
126. See Adler, supra note 9, at 138. 
127. Euel Elliott, Barry J. Seldon & James L. Regens, Political and 
Economic Determinants of Individuals’ Support for Environmental 
Spending, 51 J. Envtl. Mgmt. 15, 17–19 (1997).  
128. See id. at 20–25. 
129. Debra Israel & Arik Levinson, Willingness to Pay for Environmental 
Quality: Testable Empirical Implications of the Growth and 
Environment Literature, 3 Contributions to Econ. Analysis & 
Pol’y no. 1, 2004, at 1, 9–15. 
130. See id. at 12. 
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(seventy-two percent) is explained by the country one resides in, not 
by the socioeconomic attributes included in the analysis.131 As such, 
over two-thirds of the international variation in willingness to pay 
occurs across countries, with the rest representing within-country 
variation.132  
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon discuss data collected by the European 
Opinion Research Group in 2002 across EU15 member states on 
individual concerns regarding climate change.133 The authors report 
the percentage of survey respondents in each country reporting that 
they are “very worried” about climate change. The percentages varied 
from about twenty-one percent in The Netherlands to about sixty-
three percent in Greece.134 When asked about concern over future 
trends in climate change, the percentage responding “very much” or 
“quite a lot” varied from roughly forty-nine percent in the 
Netherlands to roughly eighty-five percent in Greece and Italy.135 
Thus, there is variation in concern over climate change both within 
and across countries. 
Professors Kahn and Matsusaka examine county-level voting on 
sixteen environmental ballot initiatives in California spanning 1970 to 
1994.136 The authors report the county with the lowest and highest 
fraction of votes in favor of each ballot initiative.137 For example, 
Proposition 1986-65 that sought to restrict the release of chemicals 
into drinking water sources received 32.7% votes in favor in the least 
favorable county and 78.3% votes in favor in the most favorable 
county.138 Other ballot measures yielded greater variation. Votes in 
favor of Proposition 1990-130 that sought to ban clear-cutting of 
forests and authorize a $742 million bond issue to buy forest land 
ranged from 15.3% in the least favorable county to 70.7% in the most 
 
131. See id. at 12, 21. 
132. See id. at 15 (“[E]ven though we have included ample demographic 
characteristics of respondents, the country fixed effects explain a large 
fraction of the variation in the responses.”). 
133. Irene Lorenzoni & Nick F. Pidgeon, Public Views on Climate Change: 
European and USA Perspectives, 77 Climatic Change 73, 76 (2006). 
134. See id. at 76 (“Some of the most worried were southern European states 
such as Greece (63%) and Italy (49%), whilst among the least worried 
were northern European nations such as The Netherlands (21% of very 
worried respondents), Ireland (25%) and the UK (26%) . . . .”). 
135. Id. at 77. 
136. Matthew E. Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental 
Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives, 40 J.L. 
& Econ. 137, 142–45, 149–51 (1997). 
137. See id. at 144–45. 
138. Id. at 144.  
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favorable county.139 This is indicative of significant variation in 
preferences across counties. Kahn and Matsusaka further find that 
much of this cross-county variation is explained by differences in per 
capita income, urban status, education, and per capita income derived 
from specific industries (construction, farming, forestry, and 
manufacturing).140  
Rather than relying on survey response data, several studies 
utilize information on home values and environmental amenities (or 
disamenities) to assess the demand for environmental quality. 
Professors Zabel and Kiel combine data from the American Housing 
Survey, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the EPA across four cities 
(Chicago, Denver, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.) from 1974 to 
1991 to estimate household-level marginal willingness to pay for air 
quality by relating local air quality to home values.141 The authors 
then examine the association between household characteristics and 
this value. In contrast to the results above, Zabel and Kiel find lower 
marginal willingness to pay for nonwhites and no meaningful 
association with gender.142  
Professors Brasington and Hite utilize data on home sales across 
six metropolitan areas in Ohio (Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, 
Columbus, Dayton, and Toledo) in 1991 to first estimate the implicit 
price of distance from the nearest environmental hazard and then 
examine the effect of price, income, and other attributes on the 
demand.143 The authors find a small, negative price elasticity of 
demand for distance from the nearest environmental hazard and a 
positive income elasticity of demand for distance from the nearest 
environmental hazard.144 Carruthers and Clark follow the strategy  
139. Id. at 145.  
140. See id. at 167 (“[A] small set of standard economic variables can 
account for the majority of the variance in county voting patterns.”). 
141. Jeffrey E. Zabel & Katherine A. Kiel, Estimating the Demand for Air 
Quality in Four U.S. Cities, 76 Land Econ. 174, 180–82 (2000). 
142. See id. at 189 (“The MWTP [marginal willingness to pay] for all four air 
quality measures is significantly lower for black and Hispanic 
households. Whether the household head is married or male does not 
appear to have a consistently significant effect on MTWP [sic] for the 
four air quality measures.”). 
143. David M. Brasington & Diane Hite, Demand for Environmental Quality: 
A Spatial Hedonic Analysis, 35 Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 57, 59–
72 (2005). 
144. Id. at 77 (“Among the demand shift variables, higher income is 
statistically significantly related to higher demand for environmental 
quality. The non-spatial models achieved the same result, but suggested 
a stronger effect than the spatial model. The estimated income elasticity 
of demand for the spatial model is 0.044. The result suggests that people 
do not purchase much more environmental quality when their incomes 
rise.”); see also id. at 78 (“The implicit price of environmental quality is 
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utilized by Brasington and Hite and examine data on home sales in 
King County, Washington in 2004.145 The authors obtain similar 
results in terms of the price and income elasticity of demand for 
distance from the nearest environmental hazard.146  
The second factor affecting the advantages to decentralization 
relates to the degree to which individuals act on variation in 
environmental preferences to sort themselves into homogeneous 
communities. The preceding studies on preferences over 
environmental quality provide little evidence in this regard. With the 
exception of Kahn and Matsusaka, the studies discussed using survey 
responses or voting behavior are geographically aggregated. Thus, 
while preferences vary across individuals, there is no information 
concerning the level of variation in the total population versus the 
level of variation in a single community. Kahn and Matsusaka, 
however, do provide evidence of significant variation in voting 
behaviors across California counties driven by differences in income 
and industrial composition.  
Studies utilizing housing prices to infer something about the 
willingness to pay for environmental amenities or how the prices of 
environmental amenities affect its demand also fail to provide insights 
into the amount of overall variation in preferences or whether 
preferences are more homogeneous at the city level than at the state 
or country level. Lastly, the empirical evidence on population mobility 
discussed in Part II.A.1 indicates that residential location choices, at 
least in the United States, are driven primarily by employment 
prospects.  
The final factor impacting the advantages to decentralized policy 
making pertains to the ability of local governments to better respond 
to community preferences than the central government. If preferences 
concerning the environment do vary across individuals and individuals 
do sort into homogeneous communities, both of which are far from 
certain, are local policy makers better able to align environmental 
policies with these preferences? While this is typically asserted, as 
evidenced by some of the quotes above, there is no evidence to 
support this contention. Wilson states: 
 
negatively related to quantity demanded; the price elasticity of demand 
of -0.12 suggests a relatively inelastic demand curve.”). 
145. John I. Carruthers & David E. Clark, Valuing Environmental Quality: A 
Space-Based Strategy, 50 J. Regional Sci. 801, 807–12 (2010). 
146. Id. at 828 (“These results are remarkably consistent with work done by 
Brasington and Hite (2005), who also found an inelastic price elasticity 
of demand . . . .”); see also id. at 829 (“That said, as expected, all of the 
elasticities that come out of this calculation are positive, meaning that 
distance from environmental hazards is a normal good so, other things 
being equal, households spend more on it as their incomes rise.”). 
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[W]e do not have a good understanding of how information 
asymmetries occur between different levels of government, and 
what exact form these asymmetries take. Rather, we have vague 
ideas, such as the understanding that local officials know more 
because they are “closer to the people.” . . . [I]t seems difficult 
to justify why the central authority cannot easily obtain the 
information that is assumed absent.147 
In sum, the empirical evidence regarding preference heterogeneity 
and its implications on environmental federalism is limited and 
incomplete. While it seems likely that preferences do vary, perhaps 
much of this variation is across countries. The main drivers of within-
country variation are income, education, and industry. Because these 
attributes are easily observed, Wilson’s point about central 
governments being as capable as localities of understanding local 
preferences appears valid. That said, it is not clear that communities 
are particularly homogeneous with respect to these attributes. For 
example, in terms of income, the level of income inequality in 1999 
across all households in the United States was 0.463 as measured by 
the Gini coefficient, a common measure of inequality.148 The Gini 
coefficient ranges from zero to one, where zero indicates perfect 
equality (all households have identical incomes) and one indicates 
perfect inequality (one household possesses all income). The 
corresponding state-level Gini coefficients ranged from 0.402 (Alaska) 
to 0.499 (New York).149 County-level Gini coefficients are available 
pooling data from 2006 to 2010. Between counties, the Gini 
coefficients vary from 0.207 (Loving, TX) to 0.645 (East Carroll 
Parish, Louisiana), while the Gini coefficient for the United States as 
a whole was 0.467 over this time period.150 Among the twenty-five 
most populous counties in the United States, the Gini coefficients 
range from 0.417 (Suffolk County, New York) to 0.601 (New York 
County, New York).151  
This suggests that there is not much sorting at the state or 
county level according to income, which is a strong predictor of 
environmental preferences. In any event, much more research is 
needed on the extent of preference heterogeneity and, more 
 
147. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 277. 
148. U.S. Census Bureau, Income: Table S4. Gini Ratios by State 
(2010), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/his
torical/state/state4.html. 
149. Id.  
150. U.S. Census Bureau, Household Income Inequality Within U.S. 
Counties: 2006–2010, at 1, 4 (2012), available at http://www.census. 
gov/prod/2012pubs/acsbr10-18.pdf. 
151. Id. at 4. 
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importantly, whether individuals sort themselves such that localities 
within a country are less heterogeneous than the country as a whole. 
C. Interjursidictional Externalities  
Efficiency of decentralized policy making in both the Tiebout and 
interjurisdictional competition frameworks requires local governments 
to internalize all externalities.152 A lengthy empirical literature has 
emerged assessing the practical relevance of spillovers across 
jurisdictions. This is crucial because the failure of local governments 
to internalize all externalities is often cited as the main argument 
against decentralized policy making. For example, Engel writes:  
The interstate spillover rationale is the classic economic 
efficiency argument that federal intervention is necessary to 
prevent the environmental, social, and economic losses that 
accrue when air and water pollution originating in one state are 
carried by natural forces into other states. States from which 
the pollution originates have little incentive to curb interstate 
pollution because they benefit from having the harmful effects of 
pollution externalized while they enjoy the economic benefits of 
the polluting activity.153  
Professor Sigman notes that the size of “spillovers across 
jurisdictions . . . is a central question in the literature on the problem 
of assigning functions to different levels of government.”154 Adler 
states: “The strongest case for federal involvement comes in the 
context of interstate spillovers.”155 Hall writes: “One of the 
foundational justifications for the federalization of environmental law 
is the problem of interstate environmental harms.”156 Dijkstra and 
Fredriksson state: “Transboundary pollution is a standard and well-
known reason for preferring centralized environmental policy 
 
152. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 93 (“Without these simplifying and 
externality internalizing assumptions, the efficiency result evaporates.”); 
see also Revesz, supra note 17, at 1212 (“Most importantly, the other 
prominent market-failure argument for federal environmental regulation 
is that, in the absence of such regulation, interstate externalities will 
lead states to underregulate because some of the benefits will accrue to 
other states.”). 
153. See Engel, supra note 64, at 285. 
154. Hilary Sigman, Letting States Do the Dirty Work: State Responsibility 
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 107, 117 
(2003). 
155. Adler, supra note 9, at 140. 
156. Noah D. Hall, Political Externalities, Federalism, and a Proposal for an 
Interstate Environmental Impact Assessment Policy, 32 Harv. Envtl. 
L. Rev. 49, 50 (2008). 
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making . . . .”157 Professor Esty notes: “While a few environmental 
harms (some waste problems, for example) are geographically 
localized, many forms of pollution (surface water contamination and 
most air pollutants, for example) spread across the land. Because 
state boundaries often do not fully encompass airsheds and 
watersheds, interjurisdictional externalities arise.”158 
The empirical literature can be categorized by the type of 
externality considered. This Article will refer to the first category as 
resource externalities. This is the case where the actions of one 
jurisdiction affect the resource quantity or quality available to other 
jurisdictions.159 These situations are discussed in Part II.C.1. The 
second category is referred to as “pecuniary externalit[ies]” by 
Wilson.160 This refers to situations where the actions of one 
jurisdiction affect prices in other jurisdictions. These situations are 
discussed in Part II.C.2. A final category of externalities is denoted by 
Wilson as “fiscal externalit[ies].”161 This is the case where the policy 
choices of one jurisdiction have effects on the policy choices of other 
jurisdictions through strategic policy making.162 This will be discussed 
in Part II.C.3. 
1. Resource Externalities 
The empirical literature on resource externalities focuses on 
whether jurisdictions fail to consider the effects of their actions on the 
quality or quantity of a resource available in other jurisdictions. 
Transboundary pollution is the canonical example. With 
transboundary pollution, one jurisdiction fails to consider the full 
environmental consequences of its actions as some of the costs—
typically in terms of greater air or water pollution—fall outside one’s 
jurisdiction. Another type of spillover may occur when resources are 
shared across multiple jurisdictions. Common examples of such shared 
 
157. See Dijkstra & Fredriksson, supra note 22, at 320. 
158. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich. L. 
Rev. 570, 625 (1996). 
159. Often resource externalities are referred to simply as spillovers. See, e.g., 
Jan K. Brueckner, Strategic Interaction Among Governments: An 
Overview of Empirical Studies, 26 Int’l Regional Sci. Rev. 175, 176 
(2003). 
160. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 272. 
161. Id.  
162. The policy choices in one location may impact prices in neighboring 
locations as well. Thus, pecuniary and fiscal externalities do overlap. 
However, the Author invokes the distinction that pecuniary externalities 
occur even absent a behavioral response from neighboring governments, 
whereas fiscal externalities explicitly require a policy response by 
neighboring jurisdictions. 
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resources are watersheds, fisheries in the ocean, and endangered 
species that are present in multiple jurisdictions. 
Professors Murdoch, Sandler, and Sargent examined emissions of 
sulphur and nitrogen oxides in twenty-five European countries during 
the 1980s and early 1990s.163 The authors explore the reductions in 
these types of emissions achieved after the formulation of the 1979 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP). 
In particular, the authors are motivated by the fact that mandated 
reductions for sulfur were more likely to be met than for nitrogen 
oxides (NOx). In an attempt to understand this, the authors 
investigate the importance of transboundary spillovers in explaining 
cross-country variation in emissions reductions achieved under 
LRTAP. Specifically, the authors estimate separate econometric 
models for the two types of emissions and incorporate two measures of 
spillovers as independent variables in the model. The first measure 
captures the fraction of a country’s emissions that stay within its own 
borders. The second measure captures the amount of emissions 
originating outside of one’s own jurisdiction that ends up in one’s 
jurisdiction.164  
Since sulfur emissions are less likely to spill across jurisdictional 
boundaries, if these variables are meaningful (in a statistical and 
economic sense) determinants of emissions, then externalities not only 
play an important role in determining emissions, but also help explain 
the disparate trends in sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions in Europe 
over this time period. The results point to a very meaningful effect of 
the second measure of spillovers: as the amount of emissions entering 
one’s jurisdiction from other countries declines, a country’s own 
emissions rise. The authors interpret this finding as indicative of free 
riding behavior by countries.165 However, the first measure is found to 
have at best a weak statistical relationship with emissions.166  
Kahn examines the importance of transboundary pollution using 
data at the county-level from the United States.167 Specifically, he 
assesses the impact of manufacturing activity in one’s own county, as 
 
163. James C. Murdoch, Todd Sandler & Keith Sargent, A Tale of Two 
Collectives: Sulphur Versus Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction in 
Europe, 64 Economica 281, 287–92 (1997). 
164. Id. at 290–91 (describing the first measure as “OWNSUL” and the 
second measure as “SPILL”). 
165. Id. at 294 (“The negative and significant estimate on the SPILL term is 
entirely consistent with strategic (within-region) free-riding associated 
with the Nash assumption . . . .”).  
166. See id. at 295 (finding the OWNSUL parameter estimates significant 
only in one specific model). 
167. Matthew E. Kahn, The Silver Lining of Rust Belt Manufacturing 
Decline, 46 J. Urb. Econ. 360, 363–65 (1999). 
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well as adjacent counties, on ambient concentrations of total 
suspended particulates (TSP). The data are from 1977, 1982, and 
1987, thus spanning a period during which manufacturing activity 
experienced large declines. However, the spatial and temporal 
variation in this decline allows Kahn to assess its impact on own and 
neighboring county air quality.  
Kahn’s results suggest that manufacturing activity in adjacent 
counties has meaningful effects on a county’s own ambient 
concentrations.168 For example, a full standard deviation increase in a 
county’s own activity in the primary metal industry raises ambient 
concentrations of TSP by 3.5%. A standard deviation increase in 
activity in the primary metals industry in a county’s adjacent 
neighbors raises a county’s own ambient concentrations of TSP by 
1.1%. A standard deviation increase in activity in the stone, clay, and 
glass industry in a county’s adjacent neighbors raises a county’s own 
ambient concentrations of TSP by 4.1%.169 For the other industries 
Kahn considers, the discrepancy between the effects of a county’s own 
activity and that of its neighbors is smaller.  
A series of studies by Sigman investigates pollution in rivers in 
order to assess the empirical relevance of transboundary spillovers. In 
the first study, Sigman uses international data on water quality 
obtained from monitoring stations on rivers administered by the 
United Nations’ Global Environmental Monitoring System Water 
Quality Monitoring Project (GEMS/Water).170 The data span 291 
river monitoring stations across forty-nine countries over the period 
from 1979 to 1996. Sigman measures water quality using biochemical 
oxygen demand (BOD). The results are consistent with free riding 
behavior by countries.171 Pollution is meaningfully higher at upstream 
locations (locations before a river flows into another country), as well 
as in rivers that form the political border between two countries. 
Interestingly, these effects apply predominantly to non-European 
Union (EU) countries.172 Thus, institutional arrangements within the 
EU are hypothesized to limit the extent of free riding in terms of river 
pollution. 
 
168. See id. at 369. 
169. Id.  
170. Hilary Sigman, International Spillovers and Water Quality in Rivers: Do 
Countries Free Ride?, 92 Am. Econ. Rev. 1152, 1152–56 (2002). 
171. Id. at 1158 (“My empirical analysis provides evidence that international 
spillovers significantly impair water quality in rivers. . . . This evidence 
of free-riding suggests that cooperation has not evolved between 
countries sharing rivers.”). 
172. See id. (“The EU appears to have successfully ameliorated free-riding: 
one cannot reject that stations upstream of internal EU borders have 
typical pollution levels.”). 
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In her next study, Sigman undertakes a similar analysis with U.S. 
data obtained from the National Stream Quality Accounting Network, 
administered by the U.S. Geologic Survey.173 The data come from 501 
monitoring stations and span the period from 1973 to 1995. Sigman 
uses changes in the “authorization” or “primacy” status of 
neighboring states under the Clean Water Act174 to assess the extent 
of upstream states to free ride on their downstream neighbors.175 Since 
the statistical procedure only utilizes temporal variation within states 
arising from changes in authorization status, the results are more 
likely to capture the causal effect of decentralized control.176 
Measuring water pollution using the EPA’s water quality index based 
on five major pollutants (dissolved oxygen, fecal coliform, total 
suspended solids, phosphorous, and nitrogen), the results indicate a 
four percent reduction in water quality at sites downstream from an 
authorized state.177 In addition, rivers forming the border between 
states suffer a six percent reduction in water quality if at least one 
state is authorized.178 
In a more recent study, Sigman continues to examine pollution 
levels in rivers at the international level using data from 
GEMS/Water spanning forty-seven countries over the period from 
1979 to 1999.179 Two measures of pollution are examined: BOD and 
fecal coliform. Compared to BOD, fecal coliform is considered to be 
more of a local pollutant.180 In contrast to his earlier studies, here 
Sigman assesses the impact of decentralization, defined at the 
country-level, on subnational variation in pollution.181 
Decentralization is either measured using a binary indicator for a 
federalist system, or as a continuous measure of the ratio of  
173. Hilary Sigman, Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of 
Environmental Policies, 50 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 82, 85–91 
(2005). 
174. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
175. Id. at 89–90. 
176. See id. at 96 (“By focusing on changes in policy regimes in upstream 
states, the estimated equations address unobserved geographic 
heterogeneity that might otherwise make it difficult to isolate such 
effects.”). 
177. Id. at 92 (“The coefficient on being downstream from an authorized 
state is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with 
free riding.”). 
178. Id. at 92–93. 
179. Hilary Sigman, Decentralization and Environmental Quality: An 
International Analysis of Water Pollution Levels and Variation, 90 
Land Econ. 114, 115–16 (2014). 
180. Id. at 116.  
181. Id. at 114–15.  
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subnational government expenditures to total government 
expenditures (net of any intergovernmental transfers).182 The most 
convincing results that utilize only temporal variation in the 
continuous measure of decentralization suggest a harmful effect of 
decentralization on BOD but not fecal coliform.183 Moreover, 
decentralization is also found to increase the subnational variation in 
both BOD and fecal coliform, consistent with a tailoring of 
decentralized policies to local preferences.184  
Other papers pursue a similar strategy to Sigman and assess the 
impact of proximity to political boundaries on pollution. Professors 
Helland and Whitford use reported emissions by U.S. establishments 
from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) spanning between 1987 and 
1996 to determine if emissions are higher from establishments located 
in counties that border neighboring states (either any border or only 
along the eastern edge).185 The results point to significantly higher air 
and water emissions in establishments located on any border, and 
effects even larger among establishments located on eastern borders.186 
Interestingly, the results point to greater spillovers when the authors 
allow for the possibility that establishments located in border counties 
may systematically differ in unobserved dimensions from other 
establishments.187 
Professors Gray and Shadbegian utilize data on 409 U.S. pulp and 
paper mills, from thirty-eight states, over the period from 1985 to 
1997.188 The authors examine plant-level air emissions of particulates 
(PM10) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) and water emissions of BOD and 
total suspended solids. The importance of spillovers is measured by  
182. Id. at 118.  
183. See id. at 123–24 (“For BOD, the coefficient is statistically significant 
and positive, with an elasticity of BOD levels to expenditure 
decentralization of 0.188. A somewhat higher point estimate emerges 
when the decentralization measure excludes national defense 
spending . . . . In the fecal coliform equations, the coefficients are not 
statistically significant for either measure of decentralization.”). 
184. Id. at 126 (“A positive effect of federalism on interjurisdictional 
variation is consistent with the traditional view of decentralization: 
when localities have more power, they choose environmental quality 
levels to correspond to local tastes and costs, resulting in greater 
heterogeneity than under central authority.”). 
185. Eric Helland & Andrew B. Whitford, Pollution Incidence and Political 
Jurisdiction: Evidence from the TRI, 46 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 
403, 407–11 (2003). 
186. See id. at 413–22. 
187. Id. at 411–22. 
188. Wayne B. Gray & Ronald J. Shadbegian, “Optimal” Pollution 
Abatement—Whose Benefits Matter, and How Much?, 47 J. Envtl. 
Econ. & Mgmt. 510, 516–21 (2004). 
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assessing the sensitivity of a plant’s emissions to the distance to the 
nearest state or Canadian border, as well as by the marginal benefits 
to reductions in air and water emissions enjoyed by neighboring 
jurisdictions.189 For plants located within fifty miles of the Canadian 
border, only BOD emissions are higher than other plants further from 
the Canadian border; SO2 emissions are lower (attributable to the 
focus on acid rain near the U.S.–Canadian border).190 The results also 
suggest that plants reduce their emissions by less when the marginal 
benefits from such reductions are enjoyed by neighboring jurisdictions. 
For example, the authors find that out-of-state benefits to a reduction 
in SO2 emissions have only one-third the impact of in-state benefits.191 
Professors Lipscomb and Mobarak assess pollution in rivers at 
upstream and downstream locations in Brazil.192 The authors analyze 
quarterly data on BOD levels from several hundred monitoring 
stations during the timeframe from 1990 to 2007. The importance of 
spillovers on pollution levels are investigated by measuring the 
distance of each station from its nearest upstream and downstream 
border. While generally such distances may be endogenous, Brazil 
frequently redraws its jurisdictional boundaries allowing the authors 
to exploit only the temporal variation in the distance of a given 
station to its nearest borders.193 Lipscomb and Mobarak find 
meaningful evidence that spillovers matter. As the distance to the 
nearest downstream border falls from ten to nine kilometers, say, 
pollution increases by 1.3%; pollution rises by 1.9% as distance falls 
from one kilometer to zero (zero represents the point at the actual 
border).194 Thus, BOD levels rise at an increasing rate as the river 
approaches its downstream border. In further analysis, the authors 
examine pairs of station monitors and find that BOD levels at the 
 
189. Id. at 516–21. 
190. Id. at 528 (“The results for plants near the Canadian border suggest 
different impacts for different pollutants. On the water pollution side we 
observe more BOD pollution and fewer inspections. On the air pollution 
side we observe less SO2 pollution and more enforcement actions. This 
focus on SO2 emissions is consistent with the substantial political 
attention paid to acid rain caused by SO2 emissions from US plants in 
the AQA treaty.”). 
191. Id. at 530. 
192. Molly Lipscomb & Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, Decentralization and 
Pollution Spillovers: Evidence from the Re-drawing of County Borders 
in Brazil (Feb. 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/mushfiqmobarak/papers/decentralization. 
pdf.  
193. Id. at 18–20.  
194. Id. at 22 (“Ten kilometers from the border, pollution increases at a rate 
of 1.3% per kilometer, whereas 1 kilometer from the border it increases 
at a rate of 1.9%.”). 
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downstream monitor, relative to BOD levels at the upstream monitor, 
are 3.1% higher per jurisdictional boundary that the river crosses 
between the two stations.195  
In more recent work, Hatfield and Kosec exploit the variation in 
the number of counties spanned by U.S. metropolitan areas to 
determine if areas divided across more counties experience greater 
pollution.196 Because division into multiple jurisdictions may not be 
random, the authors exploit jurisdictional boundaries caused by the 
presence of streams in order to isolate the causal effect of the number 
of jurisdictions on pollution.197 Pollution is measured using the average 
of the EPA’s Air Quality Index over the years between 1999 and 
2002, as well as the ambient concentrations of several individual 
pollutants.198 Finally, the authors also examine the effect of increasing 
the number of jurisdictions within a metropolitan area on drinking 
water quality using data from the EPA’s Safe Drinking Water 
Information System database. Since drinking water is a local good, 
the authors did not expect to find any effect of jurisdictional 
boundaries on this outcome.199 The results indicate a sizeable effect of 
increasing the number of counties within an area on air pollution.200 
For example, changing a metropolitan area from being entirely 
contained in one county to split among two counties worsened air 
quality by half a standard deviation and added an additional thirteen 
days per year where the air is considered unhealthy.201 Moreover, 
Hatfield and Kosec find that a similar increase from one to two 
counties within a metropolitan area increases the concentrations of 
carcinogenic pollutants by anywhere from nineteen percent to 250%, 
depending on the pollutant.202 However, the authors found no effect 
on drinking water quality, consistent with their results being driven 
by interjurisdictional externalities.203 
 
195. Id. at 25 (“For each additional border crossed, pollution increases by 
3.1%.”). 
196. John William Hatfield & Katrina Kosec, Local Environmental Quality 
and Inter-Jurisdictional Spillovers 2, 10–16 (Apr. 17, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/katrina_kosec/19/. 
197. Id. at 8–10. 
198. Id. at 11.  
199. See id. at 3 (“As a placebo analysis, we examine the effects of having 
more jurisdictions on public drinking water quality. This is a local, 
environmental, publicly-provided good without significant spillovers.”). 
200. Id. at 20. 
201. Id. at 18.  
202. Id. at 20. 
203. Id. at 22. 
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Professors Kahn, Li, and Zhao assess river pollution in China, 
taking advantage of a unique natural experiment.204 Using data from 
2004 to 2010, the authors assess relative pollution levels at internal 
versus border locations.205 Beginning in 2005, the central government 
began monitoring local compliance with environmental targets related 
to the chemical oxygen demand (COD) of rivers. Compliance became 
a criterion upon which the political promotion of local officials is 
based. Prior to 2005, local officials had little incentive to reduce river 
pollution near jurisdictional boundaries. After 2005, this is no longer 
the case for officials seeking promotion.206 However, other pollutants 
besides COD are not a part of the promotion criteria. Using pollution 
data from 499 river monitoring stations located in China’s seven 
major rivers, the authors find that the 2005 change reduced COD 
levels. Moreover, the decline was greater at border locations, 
consistent with significant transboundary pollution prior to 2005.207 
Finally, the authors find no impact of the promotion criteria on other 
measures of pollution.208  
Other studies pursue very different strategies for assessing the 
importance of interjurisdictional externalities. Banzhaf and Chupp 
present a detailed simulation model of the U.S. electricity sector, 
incorporating NOx and SO2 emissions.209 They then compare the level 
of welfare achieved under a first-best policy where each state fully 
internalizes all transboundary pollution damages, a second-best 
uniform policy across all states, and the decentralized case where each 
states acts only in its best interest. The results indicate that social 
welfare is only 0.2% lower under the second-best uniform policy 
 
204. Matthew E. Kahn, Pei Li & Daxuan Zhao, Pollution Control Effort at 
China’s River Borders: When Does Free Riding Cease? (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19620, 2013), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19620.  
205. Id. at 11–14. 
206. See id. at 3 (“In 2005, the central government changed the rules of the 
game and provided local officials with strong incentives to reduce 
specific indicators of water pollution along rivers that flow within. For 
local officials, who sought to be promoted within the Chinese political 
promotion system, compliance with these new environmental targets 
motivated them to cease free riding at boundaries.”). 
207.  Id.  
208. See id. at 19 (“We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
local governors have responded to the new promotion rules by taking 
more effort to reduce water pollution at political boundaries. Our study 
also points out a fault of the current system. Local governors focus on 
the environmental measures set by central government rather than a 
broader set of water criteria that might be more relevant for public 
health . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
209. Banzhaf & Chupp, supra note 31, at 454–57. 
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compared to the first-best policy.210 However, the decentralized case 
with self-interested states results in a 31.5% reduction in social 
welfare.211 This discrepancy does not arise due to a lack of preference 
heterogeneity across states. Rather, the welfare cost of ignoring such 
heterogeneity under the second-best uniform policy is swamped by the 
welfare cost of failing to internalize the pollution externalities.212 
Evidence of the magnitude of the externality is further provided by 
Chupp in separate work. He illustrates for two states, Arizona and 
North Carolina, that the in-state marginal benefit per ton of SO2 
reduction is only about one-fourth the marginal benefit to the nation 
as a whole.213 Banzhaf and Chupp conclude that “inter-jurisdictional 
spillovers appear to be a bigger problem in this application than 
heterogeneous benefits.”214 
Lastly, Perino and Talavera assess the determinants of state 
sulfur emissions rate standards prior to the Acid Rain Program in 
1995.215 In particular, the authors are interested in the relative 
importance of the internal costs and benefits of reduced emissions 
versus the external benefits on the state emissions standard. The state 
sulfur standard is measured by pounds of SO2 per million British 
thermal units (MMBtu). The marginal cost of a more stringent 
standard is proxied by the transportation costs incurred to import 
low-sulfur coal from Wyoming. Finally, internal and external benefits 
to emissions reductions are measured by the state’s own acidity of 
rainwater and the average acidity of rainwater in northeastern states 
(for states located in the Midwest). The results indicate that marginal 
abatement costs and internal and external benefits matter in a 
statistical sense. However, the effect of a state’s own acidity is more 
 
210. Id. at 458 (“More surprising is that the second-best uniform policy 
achieves benefits of $59.6 billion, a loss of only 0.2% of the first-best 
benefits!”). 
211. See id. (“More to the point, the states on their own are estimated to 
achieve national net benefits of $40.9 billion, simply acting out of their 
own self-interest. This is a loss of 31.5% of the total potential benefits, 
which is substantial . . . .”). 
212. See id. at 462. 
213. B. Andrew Chupp, Environmental Constituent Interest, Green 
Electricity Policies, and Legislative Voting, 62 J. Envtl. Econ. & 
Mgmt. 254, 256 (2011). 
214. Banzhaf & Chupp, supra note 31, at 450. 
215. Grischa Perino & Olena Talavera, The Benefits of Spatially 
Differentiated Regulation: The Response to Acid Rain by U.S. States 
Prior to the Acid Rain Program, 96 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 108, 110–16 
(2014).  
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than twenty times larger than the effect of the acidity of rainwater in 
the northeast.216  
Rather than focusing on pollution, several empirical studies test 
for the presence of spillover effects on enforcement of environmental 
regulations. Gray and Shadbegian, in the study of 409 paper and pulp 
establishments in the United States discussed earlier in this Part,217 
also examine determinants of the number of air and water pollution 
inspections and enforcement actions.218 The results are generally 
weaker than their reported results pertaining to emissions.219 
Nonetheless, the authors find some evidence that air pollution 
enforcement actions are higher against establishments near the 
Canadian border (consistent with the lower SO2 emissions found in 
the analysis), but fewer water pollution inspections take place against 
such plants.220  
In a subsequent study, Gray and Shadbegian use emissions data 
from 1997 on 521 U.S. manufacturing plants located within fifty miles 
of the center of three cities located near state borders (St. Louis, 
Cincinnati, and Charlotte).221 The primary purpose of the study is to 
examine the effect of prior environmental enforcement—against either 
oneself (so-called specific deterrence) or against other plants within 
ten miles (so-called general deterrence)—on subsequent plant-level 
emissions. However, a very interesting finding emerges: inspections of 
other plants within ten miles reduce a plant’s own emissions of air 
toxics (obtained from the TRI) as long as those other plants are 
located within the same state. Inspections of other nearby plants, 
which are located in another jurisdiction, fail to produce any general 
deterrent effect.222 In this case, the lack of a spillover across 
 
216. See id. at 117 (“The severity of the acid rain problem in the Northeast 
affected regulation in the Midwest, which is in line with the main inter-
state externality for acid rain in the United States. The positive sign of 
the coefficient confirms that states at least partially internalized this 
externality (i.e., lower pH level in the Northeast tightened emission 
standards in the Midwest). However, the effect is by more than an order 
of magnitude weaker than the effect of a state’s own exposure to acid 
rain.”). 
217. See supra notes 188–191 and accompanying text. 
218. See Gray & Shadbegian, supra note 188, at 518. 
219. See id. at 532 (“The results for the regulatory activity equations are 
generally less consistent with our hypotheses than those for the 
emissions equations.”). 
220. See id. at 525–28. 
221. Wayne B. Gray & Ronald J. Shadbegian, The Environmental 
Performance of Polluting Plants: A Spatial Analysis, 47 J. Regional 
Sci. 63, 69–71 (2007). 
222. See id. at 80 (“Turning to the importance of jurisdictional boundaries 
for regulatory analyses, the negative sign on INSPNBOUT shows that 
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jurisdictional boundaries reduces welfare. If enforcement were instead 
the responsibility of a higher level of government, each inspection 
would result in a greater reduction in emissions through general 
deterrence. 
More recently, Professors Konisky and Woods assessed the impact 
of proximity to jurisdictional borders on plant-level enforcement 
actions.223 Data on state-led enforcement actions—inspections, total 
punitive actions, and formal punitive actions—under the CAA 
between 1990 and 2000 are aggregated to the county-level and used to 
determine if counties on state or international borders are subject to 
less enforcement. The results indicate approximate twenty-five 
percent and fifty percent reductions in the count of inspections in 
counties bordering Canada and Mexico, respectively, but no 
meaningful effect in counties bordering other states.224 
In a follow-up study, Konisky and Woods utilize data from the 
EPA’s Integrated Database for Enforcement Analysis to assess the 
determinants of enforcement actions—compliance monitoring and 
punitive actions—against roughly 6400 facilities regulated under the 
Clean Water Act from 1995 to 2005.225 The importance of spillovers is 
assessed by examining whether a facility that discharges its effluent 
into an interstate river or a multi-state watershed is the subject of 
less enforcement action. The authors also assess, among other things, 
the impact of distance to the nearest downstream state from the point 
where a facility’s effluent likely enters a river. Konisky and Woods fail 
to find any evidence consistent with fewer enforcement actions being 
taken against firms more likely to be responsible for transboundary 
 
inspections on plants in neighboring states are not as effective at 
improving compliance. In fact, the negative coefficient on INSPNBOUT 
is larger in magnitude than the positive one on INSPNB, so increased 
inspections at plants in neighboring states would be predicted to reduce 
a plant’s compliance, although this effect is not statistically 
significant.”). 
223. David M. Konisky & Neal D. Woods, Exporting Air Pollution? 
Regulatory Enforcement and Environmental Free Riding in the United 
States, 63 Pol. Res. Q. 771, 774–76 (2010). 
224. See id. at 779 (“[T]his represents about 25 percent and 50 percent fewer 
inspections for counties bordering Canada and Mexico, respectively.”); 
see also id. at 778 (“[W]e do not find evidence that states attempt to 
export their pollution across interstate borders or to oceans or the Great 
Lakes through lax regulatory enforcement of facilities in border 
counties.”). 
225. David M. Konisky & Neal D. Woods, Environmental Free Riding in 
State Water Pollution Enforcement, 12 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 227, 233–
39 (2012). 
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pollution.226 Thus, the empirical studies to date assessing the spatial 
and temporal variation in enforcement behavior indicate less free 
riding than those assessing pollution directly. Understanding the 
source(s) of this difference is necessary. 
The final set of papers examining the empirical relevance of 
resource externalities assess the impact of decentralized decision 
making on the exploitation of shared resources. Professor McWhinnie 
analyzes data on the global exploitation status of various fish stock 
according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1994 
and 2002.227 Specifically, the FAO designates each fish stock in fifteen 
regions as underexploited, moderately exploited, fully exploited, 
overexploited, depleted, or recovering. The author then examines 
whether the number of countries that report catching a given fish in a 
given region and year help predict the exploitation status of the fish 
stock. McWhinnie finds that exploitation is increasing in the number 
of countries accessing the fish stock.228 For example, if the fish stock is 
shared by two countries rather than one, “it is 9% more likely to be 
overfished and 19% more likely to be depleted.”229 If the fish stock is 
shared by five countries rather than one, “it is 36% more likely to be 
overfished and 82% more likely to be depleted.”230  
The analysis by Burgess, Hansen, Olken, Potapov, and Sieber is 
similar to that by Hatfield and Kosec in that it explores the impact of 
dividing a given geographic area into a larger number of jurisdictions 
on the environment.231 However, Burgess, Hansen, Olken, Potapov, 
and Sieber examine the impact of the number of administrative 
jurisdictions in a given Indonesian province on the rate of 
deforestation between 2001 and 2008.232 The results indicate nearly a 
four percent increase in the annual rate of deforestation if an 
 
226. See id. at 240 (“Looking across the models for inspections and punitive 
actions, the absence of any statistically discernable border effects is 
striking.”). 
227. Stephanie F. McWhinnie, The Tragedy of the Commons in International 
Fisheries: An Empirical Examination, 57 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 
321, 323–26 (2009). 
228. See id. at 327 (“The number of countries is statistically significant at 
the 5% level and works in the anticipated direction; the more countries 
a fish stock is shared between, the more likely it is to be overexploited 
or depleted.”). 
229. Id.  
230. Id. at 327–28. 
231. Robin Burgess, Matthew Hansen, Benjamin A. Olken, Peter Potapov & 
Stefanie Sieber, The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics, 
127 Q.J. Econ. 1707, 1714–30 (2012). 
232. Id. at 1715.  
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additional district is formed within a province.233 The authors 
conclude that their analysis provides a “counterexample to those who 
argue that decentralization of control over natural resources in weakly 
governed tropical environments should enhance their conservation.”234 
2. Pecuniary Externalities 
The second category of externalities includes pecuniary 
externalities. This refers to situations where jurisdictions ignore the 
ramifications of their actions on prices in other areas. However, 
empirical evidence regarding pecuniary externalities is rare. One 
source of pecuniary externalities, in theory, is referred to as tax 
exporting and dates back at least to Gordon.235 This refers to localities 
levying excessive taxes in situations where at least a portion of the 
tax bill is paid by nonresidents (for example, hospitality taxes). In the 
context of environmental regulation, environment importing (as 
opposed to tax exporting) can arise in either of two ways. First, a 
jurisdiction may enact excessive regulation if producers of polluting 
goods are located in other jurisdictions as long as the costs cannot be 
passed fully onto consumers located in the jurisdiction. Second, a 
jurisdiction where the pollution-generating production of goods occurs 
may enact excessive regulation if producers are able to pass at least a 
portion of the regulatory costs onto consumers in other jurisdictions.  
Anecdotal evidence of the first type of behavior is found in a 
paper by Elliott, Ackerman, and Millian. The authors provide a 
historical account of the development of the Motor Vehicle Air 
Pollution Control Act of 1965.236 This was the first statute to provide 
the federal government with regulatory power over air pollution. The 
 
233. See id. at 1734 (reporting that “the annual rate of deforestation 
increases by 3.85% if an additional district is formed within a 
province”). 
234. Id. at 1751. 
235. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 580 (noting that decentralization can lead 
to inefficient outcomes due to externalities, one of which is the 
imposition of taxes on nonresidents). Another type of pecuniary 
externality is what Hall refers to as psychological externalities. This is 
the case where resources within one jurisdiction are valued by residents 
of another jurisdiction. Unique natural elements, such as Old Faithful, 
are primary examples. Destruction of such resources by the jurisdiction 
in which the resource is located can be thought of as imposing a 
pecuniary externality on residents of other jurisdictions as the price of 
utilizing (or visiting) the resource becomes infinite. See Hall, supra note 
156, at 57; see also Esty, supra note 158, at 594–97 (discussing the 
psychological externalities that people outside of the “regulating 
jurisdiction” may suffer and deeming it a “choice of public” issue). 
236. Pub. L. No. 89-272, § 202(a), 79 Stat. 992 (codified as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 7401 (2012)). For the authors’ historical account of this Act, 
see Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 14, at 330–31. 
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legislation was supported by the automobile industry, not because it 
favored reducing pollution, but rather because several states had 
adopted or were in the process of adopting stringent regulations 
regarding automobile emissions.237 Since the production of automobiles 
is geographically concentrated in a few areas, the costs of these 
regulations were born predominantly by nonresidents.238 Thus, prior 
to the passage of the federal statute, states were importing a cleaner 
environment at the expense of nonresidents.  
This history is repeating itself as states are once again pursuing 
regulations on automobile emissions for the purposes of achieving 
greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions. Professor Rabe writes:  
 
Still another state economic development incentive may relate 
to policy opportunities that, in effect, will shift most of the 
compliance costs to other jurisdictions. California’s alliance 
with other states pursuing vehicle emissions reductions can be 
considered through this lens, as none of these jurisdictions host 
large vehicle manufacturing sectors that might be jeopardized 
through aggressive transition toward lower-emission 
vehicles. . . . In turn, some of the proponent states were 
actively developing next-generation vehicle technology within 
their boundaries that might receive a boost through a 
regulatory burden imposed on conventional vehicles generally 
manufactured elsewhere.239 
 
Professors McAusland and Millimet provide indirect evidence of 
environmental importing by subnational jurisdictions.240 The authors 
use data on trade among U.S. states, among Canadian provinces, and 
between U.S. states and Canadian provinces from 1997 and 2002 to 
explore the effect of intranational and international trade on emissions 
reported in the TRI for the United States and the Canadian National 
Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI).241 McAusland and Millimet show 
theoretically that environmental regulation should become more 
 
237. See Elliott, Ackerman, & Millian, supra note 14, at 330 (providing that 
California had adopted new regulations, and that Pennsylvania and New 
York were considering doing so). 
238. See id. (“The automobile industry is in a very different strategic 
position, however, because it is geographically concentrated and its 
product, not its factories, is the main source of its pollution.”). 
239. Barry Rabe, Contested Federalism and American Climate Policy, 41 
Publius: J. Federalism 494, 502 (2011). 
240. Carol McAusland & Daniel L. Millimet, Do National Borders Matter? 
Intranational Trade, International Trade, and the Environment, 65 J. 
Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 411 (2013). 
241. Id. at 423–26. 
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stringent as trade increases because the resulting higher prices on 
locally produced goods are passed on to consumers in other 
jurisdictions.242 Moreover, because environmental regulation in the 
United States and Canada is a mix of centralized and decentralized 
control, the effect on regulatory stringency should be stronger when 
higher prices are passed onto foreign consumers.243 Thus, the 
theoretical model predicts that international trade should result in 
greater reductions in emissions than intranational trade. The authors’ 
findings are consistent with the idea of environment importing.244 
Professors Chakravorty, Nauges, and Thomas provide additional 
evidence of price spillovers due to decentralized environmental policy 
making.245 The authors examine the effect of clean fuel programs 
permitted under the CAA. Under the Act, states are permitted to 
implement their own clean fuel program for gasoline in an effort to 
reduce air pollution. The result is a proliferation of clean fuel blends; 
at least fifteen different fuel specifications are in use, which—when 
combined with three different octane levels—yield more than forty-
five unique blends.246 The authors examine the temporal and spatial 
variation in wholesale gasoline prices across states between 1995 and 
2002 due to the required usage of so-called “boutique fuels.”247 
 
242. See id. at 412 (“In regions that import actively, the majority of goods in 
a household’s consumption basket is produced abroad. Since the price of 
these imported goods depends on foreign supply conditions, overall 
consumption will be relatively unaffected by changes in local 
environmental regulation. Moreover, in actively exporting regions, much 
of consumers’ share of the regulatory burden falls largely on foreigners. 
In effect, trade partly decouples consumer welfare from the costs of local 
regulation, leading to stricter environmental regulation in states that 
trade intensely.”). 
243. See id. (“[T]he extent to which trade decouples consumption from 
regulation is substantially weaker for intranational trade, suggesting 
that the ceteris paribus effect of intranational trade on the environment 
will be smaller than of international trade.”) 
244. Id. at 434 (“Our results indicate that international trade generates 
statistically, and economically, significant benefits for the environment. 
On the other hand, intranational trade has a statistically and 
economically significant, adverse effect on the environment.”). 
245. Ujjayant Chakravorty, Céline Nauges & Alban Thomas, Clean Air 
Regulation and Heterogeneity in US Gasoline Prices, 55 J. Envtl. 
Econ. & Mgmt. 106 (2008). 
246. Id. at 106–07 (“At least 15 different types of fuel specifications are 
currently in use. Combined with the three octane grades of gasoline 
available at pumps—regular, mid-grade and premium—over 45 different 
blends are used nationwide. A new ozone rule proposed by the EPA is 
expected to add another 24 new blends into the mix in the near future. 
These fuels are often called ‘boutique fuels.’”). 
247. See id. at 119–20. 
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Specifically, the authors estimate not only the direct effect on prices 
due to requirement of a cleaner gasoline blend, but also the indirect 
effect of market segmentation.248 In other words, as the type of fuel 
required in one state becomes more distinct from the type of fuel 
required in neighboring states, prices should rise due to greater 
demands placed on refineries.249 The results confirm not only that the 
market segmentation effect is important, but that it is nearly as 
important as the direct cost effect.250 If a state changes from no 
gasoline regulation to requiring clean fuel (of the type considered in 
the analysis) for the entire state, wholesale gasoline prices are 
expected to rise by sixteen percent.251 On the other hand, if a state 
transitions from requiring the same fuel as its neighbors to a 
completely unique blend not used by any of its neighbors, wholesale 
gasoline prices are expected to rise by at least fourteen percent.252 To 
the extent that states do not take into account the higher prices 
occurring elsewhere when a state decides to require a unique fuel 
blend and thus increases its “regulatory distance” from its neighbors, 
decentralization in this case will lead to excessive heterogeneity in  
fuel blends.253   
248. Id. at 113.  
249. This is related to the general argument concerning uniform product 
standards as a rationale for centralization. See, e.g., Silvana 
Dalmazzone, Decentralization and the Environment, in Handbook of 
Fiscal Federalism 459, 466 (Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio eds., 
2006) (“[L]ocally differentiated environmental regulations in some cases 
may translate themselves in differences in product standards and in a 
consequent fragmentation of the market . . . .”); Oates, supra note 4, at 
21 (“A second role for central government can arise in cases where 
standardization in pollution-control activities across jurisdictions 
involves large cost savings. The most obvious case here involves the 
determination of emissions standards for motor vehicles. It would 
obviously be very costly for auto manufacturers to have to produce 50 
different variants of cars to satisfy the particular emissions standards of 
each state.”); Adler, supra note 9, at 148 (“[C]onsumers may benefit 
from national product standards, insofar as lower compliance costs 
result in lower consumer prices.”); Esty, supra note 158, at 618 (“In 
some circumstances uniform standards may be welfare enhancing. When 
environmental regulations are focused on products (as opposed to 
production processes), harmonization across jurisdictions can create 
important economies of scale for the businesses selling these products 
and for the states administering environmental controls.” (citation 
omitted)). 
250. See Chakravorty, Nauges & Thomas, supra note 245, at 117 (“This 
segmentation effect is found to be highly significant for both the RFG 
and OXY markets.”). 
251. Id.  
252.  Id. 
253. Id. at 118. 
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In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that localities ignore 
interjurisdictional externalities related to transboundary pollution and 
resource exploitation and these externalities entail significant welfare 
loss. The evidence is less convincing when enforcement of 
environmental regulations is examined. However, the inability of the 
general deterrent effect of local enforcement to cross political 
boundaries is noteworthy. Finally, some evidence exists suggesting 
that localities ignore the impact of their policies on the prices paid 
and the profits earned by nonresidents. More empirical evidence on 
the prevalence of tax exporting (or environment importing) is needed. 
3. Fiscal Externalities 
The final category of externalities is referred to as fiscal 
externalities—a holdover from the fiscal federalism literature. 
However, Wilson defines fiscal externalities more broadly as instances 
where the policy choices of one jurisdiction have effects on the policy 
choices of other jurisdictions through strategic policy making.254 Thus, 
the presence of such externalities violates the assumptions required for 
decentralized policy making to be efficient just as in the case of 
resource or pecuniary externalities. Konisky writes: “The economic 
efficiency results emerge from local regulators making decisions solely 
based on intrajurisdictional, not interjurisdictional, factors.”255 
Brueckner provides an excellent introduction to the notion of 
strategic interactions between governments.256 Such interactions may 
arise for three reasons. First, jurisdictions are, or are perceived to be, 
in competition for mobile resources. Second, policies in one 
jurisdiction lead to spillovers (for example, transboundary pollution) 
that alter the payoffs to different policies in other jurisdictions. Third, 
voters may judge the performance of policy makers through 
interjurisdictional comparisons, thereby creating a situation referred 
to as yardstick competition.257 
Before discussing the existing empirical evidence on strategic 
interaction, three comments are warranted. First, all three sources of 
strategic interaction are empirically equivalent in that each predicts 
that the policy choices of one jurisdiction depend on the choices of 
other jurisdictions.258 Thus, without more information, differentiating 
among the underlying causes is not possible.  
 
254. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 272. 
255. David M. Konisky, Assessing U.S. State Susceptibility to Environmental 
Regulatory Competition, 9 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 404, 406 (2009). 
256. See Brueckner, supra note 159. 
257. See id. at 176–81. 
258. See id. at 182 (“[B]oth the spillover and resource-flow models of 
strategic interaction generate reaction functions, which relate each 
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Second, whether strategic interactions occur depends upon policy 
maker perceptions.259 For example, if resources—people or capital—
are immobile, but policy makers mistakenly believe that resources are 
mobile, then strategic interactions may occur. However, if resources 
are mobile but policy makers naively assume they are not, then 
strategic interactions may be absent. Thus, the question of whether 
governments act strategically is fundamentally distinct from the 
question of resource mobility (and, similarly, the presence of actual 
spillovers or yardstick competition).260  
Third, strategic interaction is not synonymous with a race-to-the-
bottom. In theory, strategic interaction may lead to decentralized 
policies that are inefficiently lax or inefficiently stringent (referred to 
as a race-to-the-top).261 That said, one of the most common 
justifications given for centralization of environmental policy making 
is fear over a race-to-the-bottom. Engel states: “Of the numerous 
theoretical rationales used to justify federal environmental regulation, 
perhaps the most broadly compelling is the argument that without 
such regulation, states would engage in a welfare-reducing ‘race-to-
the-bottom’ in environmental standard-setting.”262 Professors List and 
Gerking argue that “in a second-best world in which initial distortions 
are present, locally determined environmental regulations are likely to 
be suboptimal when jurisdictions compete with each other to attract 
 
jurisdiction’s chosen [decision variable] to its own characteristics and to 
the choices of other jurisdictions.”). 
259. Daniel L. Millimet & Vasudha Rangaprasad, Strategic Competition 
Amongst Public Schools, 37 Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 199, 204 
(2007) (“[W]hat is relevant is the perception among the administrative 
units . . . .”). 
260. See Esty, supra note 158, at 573 (“While economists downplay fears of a 
race to the bottom, politicians cannot escape the image, in Ross Perot’s 
memorable words, of a ‘giant sucking sound’ as U.S. factories and jobs 
go down the drain to jurisdictions with more lax environmental 
standards and lower compliance costs.” (quoting Ross Perot, Save 
Your Job, Save Our Country 41 (1993))); see also Oates, supra 
note 4, at 16 (“In fact, irrespective of the actual facts on the location 
decisions in polluting industries, whether or not officials use 
environmental regulations for competitive purposes depends largely on 
perceptions. If policymakers think that these regulations matter, then 
they may well craft environmental legislation in the light of their 
objectives for economic development. Perceptions matter here.”). 
261. See Brueckner, supra note 159, at 177 (“Theory is silent regarding the 
sign of the reaction function’s slope.”); Engel, supra note 64, at 346 
(referring to the implication of strategic interaction as simply a “race to 
inefficiency” and highlighting the irrelevance of whether the race is 
actually to the top or the bottom if one simply cares about efficiency). 
262. Engel, supra note 64, at 274. 
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capital.”263 Konisky states: “A principal objection to decentralization 
of environmental regulatory authority to subnational governments in 
federal systems is the concern that it will result in a ‘race to  
the bottom.’”264 
The empirical literature on strategic interaction can be parsed 
into two strands. The first examines the impact of decentralization on 
pollution levels directly, using temporal variation in the level of 
centralization. The second directly estimates so-called spatial reaction 
functions to determine if policy choices in one jurisdiction are affected 
by the choices of other jurisdiction. A subset of this group pushes the 
analysis further in an attempt to determine if strategic interaction, to 
the extent it exists, is consistent with a race to the bottom or a race 
to the top. 
Within the first strand, several empirical papers have used 
President Ronald Reagan’s swift devolution of many aspects of 
environmental policy—referred to as new federalism—as a natural 
experiment from which to form indirect inferences concerning the 
race-to-the-bottom hypothesis.265 List and Gerking utilize state-level 
data on pollution abatement expenditures by manufacturing 
industries obtained from the Annual Survey of Manufactures over the 
period from 1973 to 1990, as well as state-level emissions data on SO2 
and NOx from the EPA over the period from 1929 to 1994.266 The 
objective is to determine if there were shifts in the levels of these 
variables in the mid-1980s after controlling for other potential 
determinants of abatement and emissions. In terms of abatement 
expenditures, the authors find mixed evidence as expenditures were 
found to increase in some sectors and decrease in others.267 There is no 
evidence that emissions worsened after the early 1980s and some 
evidence that SO2 emissions declined.268  
 
263. John A. List & Shelby Gerking, Regulatory Federalism and 
Environmental Protection in the United States, 40 J. Regional Sci. 
453, 453 (2000). 
264. David M. Konisky, Regulatory Competition and Environmental 
Enforcement: Is There a Race to the Bottom?, 51 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 
853, 853 (2007). 
265. See, e.g., Daniel L. Millimet, Assessing the Empirical Impact of 
Environmental Federalism, 43 J. Regional Sci. 711, 714–16 (2003) 
(providing a detailed description of the changes implemented under 
President Reagan). 
266. See List & Gerking, supra note 263, at 456–59. 
267. See id. at 462–63 (indicating that abatement tended to increase for the 
chemical and allieds and food and kindred product sectors). 
268. See id. at 467 (“Results for sulfur dioxides indicate that emissions net of 
real per capita income growth tended to decline after 1982.”). 
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Two follow-up studies utilize the same data as by List and 
Gerking but apply alternative econometric techniques. In a different 
study, Millimet and List compare the entire distribution of emissions 
and abatement expenditures across states before and after President 
Reagan’s new federalism policies.269 This allows the authors to 
investigate the possibility of finer changes in these variables that may 
have been overlooked in List and Gerking. Millimet and List find 
stronger evidence of a reduction in emissions and increase in 
abatement efforts in the 1980s.270 In another study, Millimet allows for 
the determinants of emissions and abatement to have differential 
effects over time and then tests for any residual effect of President 
Reagan’s new federalism policies.271 He finds little meaningful 
association between the decentralization of the 1980s and emissions, 
but does find a positive association with abatement expenditures.272  
Fomby and Lin perform a similar analysis.273 The authors use 
time series data on aggregate emissions of SO2, NOx, and volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs) in the United States from 1940 to 1998 to 
test for a structural break where the possible date of any break is 
unknown.274 The results point to structural breaks for all three 
pollutants (where the breaks represent the start of downward trends). 
However, the breaks occur in the late 1960s or 1970s, corresponding 
to the beginning of the environmental movement in the United 
States.275 There is no meaningful evidence of further breaks during the 
Reagan era.276   
269. Daniel L. Millimet & John A. List, A Natural Experiment on the “Race 
to the Bottom” Hypothesis: Testing for Stochastic Dominance in 
Temporal Pollution Trends, 65 Oxford Bull. Econ. & Stat. 395, 
398–403 (2003). 
270. See id. at 418 (“Our findings strongly reject the notion that a race to 
the bottom materialized for these three indicators when Reagan greatly 
expanded the discretionary power of states in the determination of 
environmental policy in the US during the 1980s.”). 
271. See Millimet, supra note 265, at 716–19. 
272. See id. at 731 (“The results are striking, suggesting that environmental 
decentralization did instigate a race to the top in pollution control 
expenditures by the mid-1980s when the financial position of states 
improved. Nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions results are less 
conclusive, but suggest that environmental decentralization may have 
halted the deterioration of air quality that began in the 1970s.”). 
273. Thomas B. Fomby & Limin Lin, A Change Point Analysis of the Impact 
of “Environmental Federalism” on Aggregate Air Quality in the United 
States: 1940–98, 44 Econ. Inquiry 109, 113–14 (2006). 
274. Id. at 112–14. 
275. See id. at 118 (“Although it is impossible to attribute the occurrence of 
the change points of these series to any one federal legislative act, one 
might surmise, given the proximity of the change points, that the Air 
Quality Act of 1967, the Clean Air Act of 1970, and the 1977 
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Related to Fomby and Lin is the analysis by Professors Bulte, 
List, and Strazicich.277 Here, the authors examine a related, but 
distinct, question. In particular, the authors are interested in whether 
emissions levels are converging across states over time and whether 
such convergence accelerated after the 1970s. Thus, the authors are 
not concerned with the Reagan era per se, but rather the general era 
of relative federal involvement in environmental policy making 
beginning in 1970. Data on SO2 and NOx from the EPA between 1929 
and 1999 are examined.278 The results indicate that emissions were 
converging across some states prior to 1970 and across many more 
states after 1970.279 While it is not obvious if this analysis offers much 
guidance regarding the realization of a race to the bottom, the results 
are consistent with federal involvement since 1970s leading to more 
homogeneity across states. 
Two final studies address related questions. Potoski assesses 
whether U.S. states have chosen to adopt air quality standards in 
excess of that required by the federal government.280 Data came from 
the State Air Pollution Control Survey conducted in 1998.281 Thirty-
eight states responded to the survey. Eleven of the thirty-eight states 
indicated that the state standards exceed the EPA’s ambient air 
quality standards for at least one of the six criteria pollutant.282 Eight 
states reported adopting new source performance standards that are 
more stringent than required by the EPA.283 Potoski interprets this as 
 
amendments to the Clean Air Act played important roles in changing 
the trends of the SO2 and VOC series from positive to negative and at 
least arresting the positive trend of the NOX series.”). 
276. See id. (“With respect to the effect of Reagan’s environmental 
federalism on the trends in the NOX, SO2, or VOC series, in none of 
them did there occur any additional change points after the initial 
change point occurred.”). 
277. Erwin Bulte, John A. List & Mark C. Strazicich, Regulatory Federalism 
and the Distribution of Air Pollutant Emissions, 47 J. Regional Sci. 
155 (2007). 
278. See id. at 155–57. 
279. See id. at 157. 
280. See Matthew Potoski, Clean Air Federalism: Do States Race to the 
Bottom?, 61 Pub. Admin. Rev. 335 (2001). 
281. See id. at 335.  
282. Id. at 337 (“[F]ive states (13 percent) reported that their standard for 
one of the NAAQS pollutants exceeds the USEPA’s minimum criteria, 
and six states (16 percent) reported standards exceeding NAAQS 
criteria for two or more pollutants. Thus, nearly one-third (29 percent) 
of the responding states have one or more ambient air standards that 
exceed USEPA requirements.”). 
283. Id.  
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“no evidence of a race to the bottom.”284 Oates is less optimistic, 
writing that “with a couple of minor exceptions . . . environmental 
authorities have not adopted standards for these pollutants that are 
more stringent than the federal standards.”285 That said, Oates does 
not interpret this as evidence of a race to the bottom; he explains this 
by the “extraordinarily stringent” federal standards.286 
Chang, Sigman, and Traub examine state applications for 
“authorization” or “primacy” status287 under both the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act288 (RCRA) and the Clean Water Act 
(CWA). As of 2002, forty-five states have authorization under the 
CWA and forty-eight states have authorization under the RCRA.289 
The authors explore the determinants of how quickly states were 
authorized in the two cases. The results indicate that states with 
more “green” preferences—measured by the average League of 
Conservation Voters environmental scores for a state’s federal 
congressmen—authorize significantly sooner.290 The authors infer that 
“states seek authorization in order to adopt stricter rather than 
weaker environmental policies than the federal government.”291  
The preceding studies do not suggest a race to the bottom. 
However, they do not shed any light on whether decentralization 
leads to an efficient outcome or to a race to the top. Levinson states: 
“The important question is more subtle than whether emissions go up 
or down. It is whether interjurisdictional competition and the Reagan 
decentralization caused regulations to be laxer than if they had been 
set by a welfare maximizing central planner.”292 Thus, the second 
strand of the literature tests for evidence of strategic policy making 
by jurisdictions. Brueckner provides an excellent, general overview of 
the theoretical and empirical literature concerned with strategic 
interactions between governments.293 Not only does he provide an 
introduction to the spatial econometric techniques employed to test 
 
284. Id. at 339. 
285. Oates, supra note 4, at 13. 
286. Id. 
287. Howard F. Chang, Hilary Sigman & Leah G. Traub, Endogenous 
Decentralization in Federal Environmental Policies, 37 Int’l Rev. L. & 
Econ. 39 (2014). 
288. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901 
(2012)). 
289. Chang, Sigman & Traub, supra at note 287, at 41.  
290. Id. at 49. 
291. Id. 
292. Levinson, supra note 10, at 97. 
293. See Brueckner, supra note 159. 
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for strategic behavior, but he also discusses studies examining other 
policy areas such as welfare benefits and taxation.294 Thus, this Article 
focuses exclusively on papers looking at environmental issues.  
Murdoch, Rahmatian, and Thayer use data on public recreation 
expenditures per acre of recreation land across eighty-five 
communities in the Los Angeles metropolitan area in 1987.295 The 
authors are motivated by the question of whether communities free 
ride by reducing their own expenditures when neighboring 
communities’ expenditures increase. Instead, they find the opposite; 
community expenditures increase by roughly $1000 if neighboring 
expenditures increase by $2700.296 This is consistent with a model of 
yardstick competition or competition for mobile households.  
Brueckner tests for strategic interaction using an index of growth 
controls across 173 California cities in 1988.297 The index reflects the 
number of measures adopted that are designed to constrain 
population or construction growth. Brueckner finds meaningful 
evidence of positive strategic interaction; more stringent growth 
controls in a city lead to more stringent controls in neighboring 
jurisdictions.298  
Fredriksson and Millimet test for strategic interaction across the 
forty-eight contiguous states using two measures of environmental 
regulation over the period from 1977 to 1986 and 1988 to 1994.299 
First—as in Fredriksson, List, and Millimet—the authors use an index 
based on the ratio of actual pollution abatement expenditures 
incurred by plants located in the state to the predicted level of 
expenditures based on the state’s industrial composition.300 Second,  
294. Id. Subsequent research tests for the presence of strategic interactions in 
U.S. educational policy making as well. See, e.g., Millimet & 
Rangaprasad, supra note 259; Daniel L. Millimet & Trevor Collier, 
Efficiency in Public Schools: Does Competition Matter?, 145 J. 
Econometrics 134 (2008). 
295. James C. Murdoch, Morteza Rahmatian & Mark A. Thayer, A Spatially 
Autoregressive Median Voter Model of Recreation Expenditures, 21 
Pub. Fin. Q. 334, 341–43 (1993). 
296. See id. at 347.  
297. Jan K. Brueckner, Testing for Strategic Interaction Among Local 
Governments: The Case of Growth Controls, 44 J. Urb. Econ. 438, 
448–50 (1998). 
298. See id. at 458 (“This finding provides evidence of spatial interaction in 
the choice of growth controls. The positive coefficients indicate 
that . . . cities’ reaction functions are upward sloping, so that the 
decision variables are strategic complements.”). 
299. Per G. Fredriksson & Daniel L. Millimet, Strategic Interaction and the 
Determination of Environmental Policy Across U.S. States, 51 J. Urb. 
Econ. 101 (2002). 
300. See id. at 109–11; Fredriksson, List & Millimet, supra note 90, at 1414. 
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they utilize state-level abatement expenditures scaled by state 
manufacturing output. The results indicate strong, positive effects of 
neighboring environmental stringency on a state’s own environmental 
stringency.301 Furthermore, Fredriksson and Millimet explore whether 
the results are consistent with a race to the bottom or a race to the 
top by allowing for asymmetric responses to neighboring policies. 
Specifically, they allow for the possibility that states may respond 
differently to changes in neighboring states depending on whether one 
is currently more or less stringent than one’s neighbors. The results 
are consistent with a race to the top as states are responsive only to 
changes in neighboring policy if one is initially less stringent than 
one’s neighbors.302 
Several analyses have extended this work of Fredriksson and 
Millimet in different directions. In a follow-up study, the same 
authors test for a particular pattern of strategic interaction, referred 
to as the “California effect.”303 Specifically, the authors test for the 
presence of abnormally large spillovers from California’s 
environmental policy choices to other states. The results do not 
indicate a special role of California in the degree of cross-state 
strategic interaction.304 Fredriksson, List, and Millimet extend the 
previous models to allow for cross-policy strategic interactions.305 In 
other words, in contrast to earlier models of strategic interaction, the 
authors do not estimate a model that restricts the response of one 
jurisdiction to policy changes in another jurisdiction to be limited to 
the same policy (for example, a state need not respond to changes in 
environmental regulation in neighboring states by only adjusting its 
environmental regulation). Specifically, the authors estimate a model 
that allows for the possibility that environmental, tax, and 
 
301. Fredriksson & Millimet, supra note 299, at 114 (“[T]he elasticity of own 
state environmental stringency with respect to current neighboring 
environmental abatement costs is positive and significant to at least the 
10% level of significance . . . .”). 
302. Id. at 117 (“The fact that increases in relative abatement costs have 
larger effects on the own state if neighbors initially have relatively 
stricter environmental standards implies that states are ‘pulled’ to 
stricter levels by improvements in relatively clean states (where 
marginal abatement costs may be the greatest).”). 
303. Per G. Fredriksson & Daniel L. Millimet, Is There a “California Effect” 
in US Environmental Policymaking?, 32 Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 
737 (2002). 
304. Id. at 740 (“[W]hile states are generally engaged in strategic 
environmental policymaking, we find at best a minor overall 
environmental leadership role for California.”). 
305. Per G. Fredriksson, John A. List & Daniel L. Millimet, Chasing the 
Smokestack: Strategic Policymaking with Multiple Instruments, 34 
Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 387 (2004). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·201 
Environmental Federalism 
1725 
expenditure policies are jointly determined and thus any policy may 
respond to changes in neighboring states. Environmental regulation is 
measured as in the prior studies. Tax policy is measured using data 
on tax effort obtained from the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations. And expenditures are measured using 
data on total general expenditures obtained from the Compendium of 
State Government Finances. The results provide strong evidence of 
not only cross-state strategic interactions within policy arenas, but 
also across arenas.306 This is consistent with the empirical fact that 
states utilize a package of incentives in an attempt to attract capital. 
Levinson extends this work in an interesting direction. First, he 
combines the spatial models of strategic interaction with the natural 
experiment concerning President Reagan’s decentralization to see if 
cross-state strategic interaction accelerated during the Reagan era.307 
He finds little meaningful evidence that the extent of strategic policy 
making changed after 1981; states act strategically in both periods.308 
Second, Levinson tests for the presence of strategic interaction in the 
setting of hazardous waste disposal tax rates across states over the 
period from 1989 to 1995.309 He finds strong evidence of strategic 
interaction beginning in 1992, after the Supreme Court ruled that 
states are not able to levy different rates depending on whether the 
waste originated instate or out-of-state.310  
Several studies test for cross-state strategic interaction using 
measures of environmental enforcement. Woods examines state 
enforcement of environmental regulation in the surface-mining 
industry.311 Enforcement is measured using the number of violations 
 
306. See id. at 408 (“Our findings are consistent with the notion that 
reaction functions between policies have a nonzero slope. For example, 
we find that states respond to increased governmental expenditure levels 
of neighbors by lowering their own pollution standards.”). 
307. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 98–100. 
308. See id. at 100 (“After 1981, the coefficient on neighboring states’ 
regulations seems to decrease, suggesting that reaction functions got a 
tiny bit less steep, though the coefficient estimate on the interaction 
term is not statistically significant.”). 
309. Id. at 100–02. 
310. See id. at 102 (“The reaction functions look somewhat different, 
however, when we compare them before and after the 1992 Supreme 
Court decision prohibiting discriminatory taxation. One way to view 
this is that before 1992 there was no particular reason to raise one’s own 
disposal tax in response to a neighbor. Instead, states could simply raise 
the tax they charge other states for disposal, while leaving disposal taxes 
low for waste generated locally.”). 
311. See Neal D. Woods, Interstate Competition and Environmental 
Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis, 87 Soc. Sci. Q. 
174 (2006). 
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and cessation orders issued by a state in a year scaled by the number 
of mines in the state. The data for the twenty-three states that had 
primary enforcement authority for this industry are obtained from the 
Office of Surface Mining Annual Report for the period between 1987 
and 1999.312 The results, first and foremost, indicate the presence of 
strategic interaction; state enforcement depends on how one’s own 
past enforcement levels compare to one’s neighbors.313 However, the 
results are counter to Fredriksson and Millimet in that states are 
found to only respond to their neighbors if the neighbors are relatively 
lax in terms of enforcement.314 
A series of studies by Konisky use state-level data on inspections 
and punitive actions taken under the CAA, CWA, and RCRA from 
1985 to 2000.315 The data are obtained from the EPA’s Integrated 
Database for Enforcement Analysis. In the first study, Konisky 
affirms the primary result from prior studies; a ten percent increase in 
neighboring enforcement activity leads to a five to fifteen percent 
increase in a state’s own enforcement activity.316 In the second study, 
Konisky extends the analysis by allowing for asymmetric responses 
depending on whether or not a state is considered economically 
susceptible. However, he finds that states are equally likely to engage 
in strategic policy making regardless of their current level of economic 
vulnerability.317  
Professors Davies and Naughton utilize a similar econometric 
framework but assess country-level decisions to ratify any of 110 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) containing explicit 
environmental targets or requirements.318 The data contain 139  
312. Id. at 180–83. 
313. Id. at 185 (“[S]tate enforcement stringency declines significantly in 
states in which the enforcement stringency exceeded their competitor’s 
average during the previous year.”). 
314. See id. at 184 (“[S]tates do not respond to the regulatory behavior of 
competitor states when their average stringency is greater than the 
state’s own.”). 
315. See Konisky, supra note 264; Konisky, supra note 255. 
316. Konisky, supra note 264, at 853–54 (“I find elasticities in the range of 
about .5 to 1.5, which suggests that states respond to a 10% increase 
(decrease) in their competitor states’ enforcement efforts with a 5% to 
15% increase (decrease) in their own enforcement efforts.”). 
317. See Konisky, supra note 255, at 416 (“[I]n none of the models is it the 
case that states more susceptible to interstate economic competition are 
more likely to respond to the regulatory enforcement behavior of 
competitor states.”). 
318. Ronald B. Davies & Helen T. Naughton, Cooperation in Environmental 
Policy: A Spatial Approach, Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin., Apr. 27, 2013, 
available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10797-013- 
9280-1#.  
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countries spanning the period from 1980 to 1999. The results provide 
meaningful evidence of strategic interaction in environmental policy 
making at the country level; a ten percent increase in the number of 
treaties participated in by one’s neighbors raises one’s own 
participation by about 1.5%.319 Furthermore, the analysis reveals that 
this strategic interaction is driven by countries—OECD and non-
OECD alike—reacting to ratifications by other OECD countries.320 
This result is consistent with the asymmetric results in the initial 
Fredriksson and Millimet study in that OECD countries are likely to 
be more environmentally stringent on average.  
Two final studies on strategic interaction in environmental policy 
making merit attention. Engel and Konisky explore the possibility of 
strategic policy making not by estimating a spatial econometric 
model, but rather by directly surveying state environmental managers 
in the United States.321 Engel surveyed eighty state environmental 
regulators in 1996. Engel summarizes the findings: “[T]he possibility 
that industry might relocate or site a new plant elsewhere is 
something of a concern to the environmental regulators in many 
states, and affects environmental policy making in some manner in 
most states.”322 However, the survey responses do not yield much 
guidance as to whether such strategic behavior is more in line with a 
race to the bottom or race to the top.323 
Konisky surveyed senior managers in state environmental agencies 
in 2005. The survey was mailed to 1459 officials; the response rate 
was roughly thirty-four percent. In contrast to Engel, the sample size 
is larger and contains career managers rather than political 
appointees.324 Several findings are noteworthy. First, only about ten 
percent of the respondents indicated that they were “not sure” how 
enforcement in their state ranked relative to other states.325 Second, 
more than sixty percent responded that other states’ actions 
influenced their own state’s actions; over ten percent indicated it has 
a significant effect.326 Third, while more than seventy percent of the 
 
319. See id. at 21 (“[W]e find positive and significant coefficients of 
approximately 0.15.”). 
320. Id. at 25 (“[T]reaty participation by OECD countries impacts that of 
both OECD and non-OECD countries.”). 
321. See Engel, supra note 64, at 337–47; David M. Konisky, Regulator 
Attitudes and the Environmental Race to the Bottom Argument, 18 J. 
Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 321, 325–26 (2007). 
322. Engel, supra note 64, at 340–41.  
323. See id. at 345. 
324. Konisky, supra note 321, at 326.  
325. Id. at 328 tbl.1. 
326. Id. at 329. 
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respondents indicated their belief that environmental regulations are a 
“fairly important” or “very important” factor in firm location 
decisions, this ranked lower than their perceived importance of 
transportation, labor costs and quality, proximity to customers or 
markets, taxes, and proximity to natural resources or raw materials.327 
That said, almost sixty percent responded that concerns over the 
impact on industry played a “fairly important” or “very important” 
role in the discouragement or opposition to adoption of a more 
stringent environmental standard.328 More than twenty-five percent 
said that concern over the impact on industry played a “fairly 
important” or “very important” role in the decision to allow or 
advocate allowing greater emissions or discharges.329  
In sum, the evidence concerning the presence of strategic policy 
making in the environmental arena is much stronger than the 
evidence concerning the influence of environmental policy making on 
firm location or industry competitiveness. One possible explanation 
for this apparent contradiction is that politicians are not economically 
rational. Engel discusses the possibility that “state regulators are 
simply not aware of the evidence demonstrating the unimportance of 
environmental standards to firm location.”330 However, she goes on to 
argue that it is more plausible that “environmental regulators . . . are 
responding to different incentives” as they are “subject to politically 
rational, but not always economically rational, political pressures to 
accommodate industry with the use of less stringent environmental 
standards.”331 Consistent with the notion that politicians are 
responding to political incentives, evidence indicates that states favor 
uniform environmental standards. Engel writes:  
[S]tates strive to mimic the standards of other states—activity 
that is at least consistent with the hypothesis that states act 
strategically when establishing environmental standards. On 
average, environmental regulators agreed “strongly” with the 
proposition that their state’s standards be of about the same 
stringency as the standards of neighboring states.332  
Thus, yardstick competition may be a more likely explanation for 
strategic behavior than “economically irrational” resource 
competition. Regardless of the source, the empirical evidence of 
 
327. Id. at 331. 
328. Id. at 334. 
329. Id. at 333 tbl.4. 
330. Engel, supra note 64, at 352. 
331. Id. at 353. 
332. Id. at 344 (citation omitted). 
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strategic interaction in environmental policy making at the city, state, 
and national level is convincing. 
There is an additional issue regarding strategic policy making that 
merits discussion. The preceding studies test for horizontal strategic 
interaction in an environmental context. Here, horizontal refers to the 
fact that the governments being examined are at the same level. 
Vertical interactions, on the other hand, may arise due to fiscal 
externalities spanning different levels of government when each 
possesses some regulatory power over the same base.333 While 
apparently unexplored in the environmental context, this issue is a 
potentially salient one moving forward given increasing reliance on a 
system of cooperative federalism in the United States and elsewhere. 
For example, Esty discusses arrangements whereby the U.S. federal 
government sets minimum standards and allows states the possibility 
of exceeding these standards if desired.334 Professor Williams states: 
“In recent years [cases in which state governments chose to override 
federal environmental regulation with tighter regulations of their own] 
have become more common, even for pollutants that have substantial 
spillovers across states . . . .”335 In other situations, it may be that the 
federal government sets standards related to some environmental 
issues (for example, federal ambient air quality standards for criteria 
pollutants), but states settle other environmental issues (for example, 
hazardous waste disposal taxes).336 Thus, federal and state 
governments can be seen as both taxing the same industrial base. 
Professors Goulder and Stavins write: “The coexistence of state and 
 
333. Specifically, externalities arise because each level of government fails to 
account for the fact that its taxes reduce the size of the tax base 
available to other levels. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 289–91. 
334. See Esty, supra note 158, at 620–21 (“Centralized environmental 
regulation, moreover, need not mandate fixed uniform standards. One 
important alternative is minimum standards that provide a limited 
common goal, ensuring that all parties meet a basic level of 
environmental protection. For some jurisdictions, baseline standards 
may be the most appropriate endpoint for their environmental programs 
given their level of economic development and other specific 
circumstances. In other jurisdictions, more stringent standards will be 
appropriate given higher levels of available resources and greater public 
demand for environmental protection. Under a system of minimum 
standards, governments remain free to adopt a higher level of 
environmental protection.”). 
335. Roberton C. Williams III, Growing State-Federal Conflicts in 
Environmental Policy: The Role of Market-Based Regulation, 96 J. 
Pub. Econ. 1092, 1092 (2012). 
336. Cf. James Alm & H. Spencer Banzhaf, Designing Economic Instruments 
for the Environment in a Decentralized Fiscal System, 26 J. Econ. 
Surv. 177, 182 (2012) (“[M]ultiple instruments are often used for a 
single pollution problem in a single country.”). 
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federal policies raises questions about their interactions. Problems 
arise when state and federal policies overlap.”337 
There seems to be no formal empirical evidence regarding the 
nature of any strategic interactions between subnational and national 
governments in the context of environmental policy.338 Thus, if there 
is indeed a push for something akin to the cooperative federalism 
described in Esty,339 this is an area in desperate need for both 
theoretical and empirical research. However, as a starting point, there 
are several studies looking at vertical policy interactions in  
tax setting.  
A series of studies examine the case of gasoline and cigarette 
taxation in the United States. Professors Besley and Rosen utilize 
data from 1975 to 1989.340 The results indicate that states increase 
their gasoline and cigarette taxes by about three to four cents per 
each ten cent increase in the corresponding federal tax rate.341 
Professors Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano analyze data over the 
period from 1977 to 1997.342 They obtain weaker results for cigarette 
taxes, but continue to find a positive effect of federal gasoline tax 
rates on state tax rates.343 However, Professors Fredriksson and 
Mamun revisit the issue of cigarette taxation using data from 1975 to 
2001.344 The authors find a meaningful effect. When focusing on data 
 
337. Lawrence H. Goulder & Robert N. Stavins, Challenges from State-
Federal Interactions in US Climate Change Policy, 101 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 253, 257 (2011). 
338. But see Chang, Sigman & Taub, supra note 287 (assessing federal 
delegation of environmental authority to states under the CWA and 
RCRA); W. Bowman Cutter & J.R. DeShazo, The Environmental 
Consequences of Decentralizing the Decision to Decentralize, 53 J. 
Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 32 (2007) (examining the implementation of 
authorization under the RCRA in California in the early 1990s and 
determining that once cities received authorization to regulate 
enforcement efforts increased but that it is unlikely that authorization of 
other cities would result in the same increase).  
339. See Esty, supra note 158, at 620–21. 
340. See Timothy J. Besley & Harvey S. Rosen, Vertical Externalities in Tax 
Setting: Evidence from Gasoline and Cigarettes, 70 J. Pub. Econ. 
(1998). 
341. See id. at 392. 
342. See M.P. Devereux, B. Lockwood & M. Redoano, Horizontal and 
Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some Evidence from the 
USA, 91 J. Pub. Econ. 451 (2007). 
343. See id. at 475 (“For gasoline . . . the federal tax plays a significant role, 
indicating the presence of some vertical competition.”). 
344. See Per G. Fredriksson & Khawaja A. Mamun, Vertical Externalities in 
Cigarette Taxation: Do Tax Revenues Go Up in Smoke?, 64 J. Urb. 
Econ. 35, 37–40 (2008). 
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from 1982 to 2001, the results indicate that states reduce their taxes 
by up to five cents per each ten cent increase in the federal tax rate.345 
The authors attribute this difference to the additional years of data 
from the Reagan era of new federalism, as well as the addition of 
various independent variables to control for political economy issues.  
Professor Goodspeed uses data across thirteen OECD countries 
from 1975 to 1984 to test if local income tax rates are affected by 
national income tax rates.346 Local tax rates are measured by total 
local personal income tax revenue scaled by gross national product 
(GNP). National tax rates are measured by total federal and state 
income tax revenue scaled by GNP. Thus, states are lumped together 
with the central government. He obtains a negative effect of national 
tax rates on local tax rates; the estimates imply an elasticity of about 
-0.5.347 
Professors Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé assessed the impact of 
federal tax rates on state personal income and general sales taxes.348 
The data covered the forty-one states with an income tax between 
1987 and 1996. Tax rates were measured as state or federal income 
tax revenue scaled by personal income. State tax rates were also 
measured by the sum of state income and general sales tax scaled by 
personal income. The results are consistent with the Besey and Rosen 
study. Specifically, a ten percent increase in the federal tax rate leads 
to about a one percent increase in state income tax rates and a two 
percent increase in state income plus general sales tax rates.349 
A final set of analyses is based on Canadian, Swedish, and Swiss 
data. Professors Hayashi and Boadway focused on business taxation 
in Canada and define the provincial business tax rate as corporate 
income tax revenues scaled by corporate profits earned in the 
 
345. See id. at 47 (“Our empirical results for the 1982/83–2001 time period 
suggest the presence of a negative vertical externality between different 
levels of government in the US. In particular, our evidence suggests that 
an increase in the federal cigarette tax may reduce the average state 
cigarette tax rate by 15 to 48 cents.”); id. at 42–43 (“Model VIII 
suggests that states reduce their real cigarette tax rates by 48 cents per 
real dollar increase in the federal tax rate.”). 
346. See Timothy J. Goodspeed, Tax Structure in a Federation, 75 J. Pub. 
Econ. 493 (2000). 
347. See id. at 500 (“The point estimate for the most complete 
specification . . . corresponds to an elasticity of about -0.5.”). 
348. See Álex Esteller-Moré & Albert Solé-Ollé, Vertical Income Tax 
Externalities and Fiscal Interdependence: Evidence from the US, 31 
Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 247 (2001). 
349. See id. at 262 (“[T]here is a significant positive interdependence between 
federal and state tax rates. A 1% point change in the federal tax burden 
supposes an average variation in the income state tax rate around 0.10% 
and of 0.22% in the combined state income plus sales tax rate.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·201 
Environmental Federalism 
1732 
province.350 The federal rate is obtained similarly using federal 
corporate income tax revenues. The data covered the period from 
1963 to 1996. Contrary to the prior study on the United States, the 
results indicate that provinces respond to higher federal tax rates by 
substantially reducing their own rates.351 Professors Andersson, 
Aronsson, and Wikström study local (municipality) and regional 
(county) personal income tax rates in Sweden from 1981 to 1990.352 
Again, the results indicate that local tax rates are reduced in response 
to higher regional tax rates.353 Brülhart and Jametti examined local 
(municipality) and regional (canton) tax rates in Switzerland in select 
years spanning in the period from 1985 to 2001.354 Here, the results 
indicated higher local tax rates in response to an increase in regional 
tax rates.355 
Thus, the empirical evidence appears to confirm the existence of 
vertical tax externalities in federations. However, whether strategic 
policy making leads to inefficiently high or low taxation is unclear and 
may vary across locations and the type of tax considered. 
Theoretically, the effects of vertical tax competition on efficiency have 
been shown to depend crucially on the order of moves and the 
political objectives of the different levels of government, which is the 
subject of Part II.D. Wilson concludes: “Clearly, the best case for 
efficiency will occur when the federal government is benevolent and is 
able to move first, so that it can influence the behavior of the state 
governments.”356 However, significant research is needed that 
incorporates the peculiarities of cooperative federalism with regards to 
 
350. See Masayoshi Hayashi & Robin Boadway, An Empirical Analysis of 
Intergovernmental Tax Interaction: The Case of Business Income Taxes 
in Canada, 34 Can. J. Econ. 481 (2001). 
351. See id. at 501–02 (“[V]ertical responses of provincial taxes to 
the federal tax are negative . . . .”). 
352. See Linda Andersson, Thomas Aronsson & Magnus Wikström, Testing 
for Vertical Fiscal Externalities, 11 Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 243, 250–
52 (2004). 
353. See id. at 256 (“[T]here is a negative relationship between the tax rates 
chosen by the two levels of government.”). 
354. See Marius Brülhart & Mario Jametti, Vertical Versus Horizontal Tax 
Externalities: An Empirical Test, 90 J. Pub. Econ. 2027, 2042–45 
(2006). 
355. See id. at 2051 (“This suggests that the strategic complementarity of 
municipal and cantonal tax rates is two-directional: municipalities on 
average react to higher cantonal tax rates by raising their own tax rate, 
and cantonal governments react to higher municipal tax rates by raising 
the cantonal tax rate.”). 
356. Wilson, supra note 8, at 290. 
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environmental regulation into existing theoretical and empirical 
models of vertical interactions. 
D. Political Economy 
Both the Tiebout and interjurisdictional competition frameworks 
make strong assumptions concerning the behavior of governments. 
The Tiebout model assumes that communities adjust policies 
optimally to attract (or repel) residents.357 The interjurisdictional 
competition model assumes that governments maximize a known 
social welfare function.358 In practice, there are several reasons why 
decentralized policy makers may not behave in this fashion. First, as 
posited in so-called Leviathan models of government behavior, policy 
makers may seek to maximize the size of the local tax base rather 
than social welfare. Second, lobbying behavior or explicit corruption 
may induce policy makers to deviate from socially optimal policies. 
Third, individuals may abstain from participation in the political 
process. Fourth, policy makers may aim to maximize social welfare 
but make mistakes. Mistakes may arise either due to imperfect 
scientific knowledge or the so-called winner’s curse. A final reason, in 
the context of the Tiebout model, for local governments possibly 
deviating from the assumed behavior pertains to differential mobility 
rates across population segments discussed in Part II.A. Thus, this 
Part does not revisit that issue in its discussion. 
Before discussing the empirical literatures with regard to these 
issues, it is important to reiterate that what is relevant for the debate 
over environmental federalism is not simply whether local policy 
makers stray from socially optimal decisions, but rather how any such 
deviations compare to political economy distortions at the  
federal level. 
1. Leviathan  
Leviathan models suppose that governments seek to maximize tax 
revenues rather than social welfare.359 As such, tax rates (or, in this 
case, any revenue-generating environmental instrument) are set 
inefficiently high. Wilson notes that capital mobility limits the ability 
of policy makers to behave in this manner; capital can move to avoid 
 
357. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 17, at 1236 (“[C]ommunities below the 
optimal size seek to attract new residents in order to lower the average 
cost of providing services.”). 
358. See Oates, supra note 16, at 1136 (“[P]ublic officials seek in their 
decisions to maximize the welfare of their constituencies . . . .”). 
359. See Wallace E. Oates, Searching for Leviathan: A Reply and Some 
Further Reflections, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 578, 578 (1989); Wilson, supra 
note 8, at 296. 
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excessively high taxes.360 Because capital may be less mobile across 
countries than within countries, the federal government may be more 
capable of acting like a Leviathan. Thus, decentralization is predicted 
to result in lower tax rates as rates move towards the efficient level. 
However, Wilson goes on to state that if decentralized policy makers 
behave strategically, as discussed in Part II.C.3, then capital mobility 
may lead to a race to the bottom in which decentralized tax rates are 
inefficiently low and less than what would be set by the federal 
government.361 As a result, Leviathan and race to the bottom models 
both predict that decentralized tax rates will be lower than those set 
by the central government.362 In the former case, this reduction entails 
a movement toward the socially optimal level, while the latter results 
in a movement away from social optimality.  
This theoretical result implies that obtaining empirical evidence 
supporting or refuting the Leviathan model is difficult. One can 
certainly assess the empirical associations between the relative power 
of the top tier of government (referred to as “centralism”), the extent 
of competition among lower tiers of government (referred to as 
“fragmentation”), and policy outcomes.363 However, whether the 
results support or refute the Leviathan model is unknown without 
knowledge of the efficient tax rate.364 Evidence of smaller public 
sectors in decentralized economies is consistent with, but not proof of, 
the Leviathan model.  
Aside from the difficulties arising from the inability to observe the 
efficient level of taxation, the empirical literature must also confront 
data issues surrounding the proper measurement of decentralization, 
as well as the possible endogeneity of decentralization. In light of the  
360. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 298 (“[C]apital mobility . . . is likely to 
play a similar efficiency-enhancing role. In this case, government officials 
will engage in expenditure competition by increasing those public inputs 
that enhance the productivity of capital.”). 
361. See id. (“[I]t is also possible that this competition for capital might 
inefficiently distort the pattern of public expenditures away from 
expenditures on public goods or inputs that do not enhance capital 
productivity . . . .”). 
362. See id. at 296 (“It is difficult to ascertain empirically whether the 
welfare-improving or welfare-worsening view of tax competition is more 
accurate, since both views seem to predict that an increase in the 
number of competing governments should reduce the total size of 
government.”) 
363. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Zax, Is There a Leviathan in Your Neighborhood?, 
79 Am. Econ. Rev. 560 (1989) (measuring the effects of the “two 
distinct dimensions” of decentralization: centralism and fragmentation). 
364. See id. at 566 (“The effects of increased centralism are consistent with 
the monopoly predictions of Leviathan models. . . . Whether a local 
government sector configured in this way would be ‘optimal’ remains, of 
course, an open question.”). 
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numerous difficulties testing the Leviathan model empirically, this 
Article does not provide a detailed survey of the existing literature. 
However, Oates provides an early survey.365 And Professors Crowley 
and Sobel offer a recent addition to the literature and provide a more 
current literature review.366 The authors state that the “previous 
literature has examined local, state, and international data and has 
found mixed results.”367 Thus, whether the Leviathan model can be 
empirically supported, particularly in the context of environmental 
issues, is an open question. 
2. Lobbying and Corruption 
Aside from government preferences as to tax revenues, policies 
may also deviate from socially optimal levels due to lobbying 
influence or corruption. Esty concludes that there exists no evidence 
on the relative size of special interest distortions at the local versus 
federal levels.368 Revesz counters the notion that environmental 
interest groups are stronger at the federal level and hypothesizes that 
the reverse may be true because of the typical grass-roots nature of 
environmental groups.369 Professors Fredriksson and Gaston posit a 
theoretical model where capital has no incentive to lobby at the local 
level if it is mobile; it can simply relocate if policies are not to its 
liking.370 Thus, environmental lobbying is offset by capital mobility, 
not industry lobbying, at the local level. However, with centralized 
policy making, both environmental and industry groups have an 
 
365. See Oates, supra note 359. 
366. See George R. Crowley & Russell S. Sobel, Does Fiscal Decentralization 
Constrain Leviathan? New Evidence from Local Property Tax 
Competition, 149 Pub. Choice 5 (2011). 
367. Id. at 6. 
368. See Esty, supra note 158, at 649–50 (“[E]nvironmental decisionmaking is 
particularly susceptible to special interest distortion. Rent-seeking 
behavior undoubtedly affects national as well as state environmental 
policymaking, but there is no evidence that public decisionmaking is 
systematically more distorted at the federal than at state and local 
levels. Indeed, given general popular indifference to many state and local 
environmental decisions, as well as greater media attention to federal-
level activities, one might suggest precisely the opposite.” (citations 
omitted)). 
369. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A 
Public Choice Analysis, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 568–71 (2001). 
370. See Per G. Fredriksson & Noel Gaston, Environmental Governance in 
Federal Systems: The Effects of Capital Competition and Lobby Groups, 
38 Econ. Inquiry 501, 508 (2000) (“[C]apital owners are unlikely to 
engage in costly lobbying activities if they can move . . . .”). 
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incentive to lobby (if capital is not perfectly mobile across national 
borders).371  
In terms of corruption, theoretical arguments are also ambiguous. 
For example, Professor Weingast argues that decentralization limits 
corruption through interjurisdictional competition.372 However, 
Professors Shleifer and Vishny hypothesize that access to the same 
bribe base (as opposed to tax base) may result in greater levels of 
corruption.373 Notably, Shleifer and Vishny’s argument does not make 
the case for greater corruption at the federal or local level, but rather 
it indicates that the system of simultaneous policy making itself 
results in greater corruption.  
The empirical evidence on lobbying and corruption is equally as 
mixed in the findings as the theoretical arguments. To begin the 
review of the empirical evidence, one strand of the literature addresses 
this issue indirectly by examining specific policy examples to ascertain 
whether the outcome was influenced by political motives. Two such 
studies examine particular instances of EPA behavior; thus, the 
findings shed some light on political influences within federal 
environmental decision making. 
In the first of these studies, Professor Hird examines EPA outlays 
under Superfund.374 Under the program, abandoned hazardous waste 
sites are evaluated and given a Hazard Ranking System (HRS) score. 
If the HRS score exceeds a certain threshold, the site is added to the 
National Priorities List (NPL). Hird obtains data on 799 sites on the 
NPL as of December 31, 1988, from the Superfund data collection 
system (CERCLIS). He examines determinants of the number of NPL 
 
371. See id. (“[T]he immobility which leaves capital exposed to stricter 
regulation of its production may be offset by a ‘lobbying effect’ that 
creates increased political pressure for more lenient regulation.”). 
372. See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: 
Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. 
Econ. & Org. 1, 6 (1995) (“Federalism thus greatly diminishes the 
level and pervasiveness of economic rent-seeking and the formation of 
distributional coalitions. Competition among the lower units limits the 
success from rent-seeking.”); see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. Econ. 599, 610 (1993) (“[C]ompetition 
between bureaucrats in the provision of government goods . . . will drive 
bribes down to zero.”). 
373. See Schleifer & Vishny, supra note 372, at 615 (“[T]he weakness of 
central government, which allows various governmental agencies and 
bureaucracies to impose independent bribes on private agents seeking 
complementary permits from these agencies. When the entry of these 
agencies into regulation is free, they will drive the cumulative bribe 
burden on private agents to infinity.”). 
374. See John A. Hird, Superfund Expenditures and Cleanup Priorities: 
Distributive Politics or the Public Interest?, 9 J. Pol’y Analysis & 
Mgmt. 455 (1990). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·201 
Environmental Federalism 
1737 
sites per state, the length of time spanned between when a site was 
initially proposed and when its status became final, total expenditures 
on a site as of 1988, and planned future expenditures by the EPA on 
a site.375 The empirical model assesses whether political variables 
related to the committee assignments of a state’s U.S. senators and 
representatives influence these allocation outcomes after controlling 
for other attributes of a site such as its HRS score. The results 
indicate that having senators or representatives from a state on key 
Senate and House subcommittees may influence the total number of 
sites on the NPL in a given state and how quickly a site progresses  
to final status.376 However, these political variables have no 
meaningful influence on the level of current or future expenditures at 
a given site.377 
The second of these studies is by Cropper, Evans, Berardi, Ducla-
Soares, and Portney, who analyze EPA decisions concerning cancer-
causing pesticides between 1975 and 1989.378 Under the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the EPA was 
required to reregister the 600 active ingredients appearing in various 
pesticides. If the ingredient was found to pose a significant risk to 
humans or animals, the EPA was to conduct a special review to weigh 
the benefits and costs of the reregistration of the ingredient.379 Over 
the time period studied, a special review was completed for thirty-
seven ingredients. Of these, nineteen involved ingredients used to 
treat food crops and found to cause cancer in laboratory animals. For 
each of these ingredients, the EPA made separate decisions for each 
type of crop to which it is applied. In total, 245 ingredient-crop 
combinations were decided upon by special review; ninety-six were 
banned.380 Controlling for cancer risk as well as economic importance, 
the authors assess whether public comments submitted to the EPA 
during the review process by environmental groups, industry groups, 
and academics affected the outcome. The results do indicate that the 
cancellation decisions were affected by the existence of public 
comments by each of the three groups; comments by environmental 
groups raised the probability of cancellation, while the existence of 
comments by industry groups and academics lowered the cancellation 
 
375. Id. at 469–71. 
376. See id. at 477–78. 
377. See id. at 477. 
378. See Maureen L. Cropper, William N. Evans, Stephen J. Berardi, Maria 
M. Ducla-Soares & Paul R. Portney, The Determinants of Pesticide 
Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making, 100 J. Pol. 
Econ. 175 (1992). 
379. Id. at 178–79. 
380. Id. at 179, 180 tbl.1. 
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probability.381 While the magnitude of the effect of environmental 
groups was larger than the corresponding effect of industry groups, 
the combined effect of industry groups and academics was greater.382 
A similar strand of studies has undertaken analyses at the state 
level. Professors Hays, Esler, and Hays examine cross-state variation 
in the Green Policy Index, which is a function of the existence of fifty 
different environment-related policies and the extent of commitment 
to seventeen environmental programs common to all states.383 The 
index is computed based on data from 1987 to 1991. Among the 
various determinants of the index considered, the authors include a 
measure of environmental pressure—state membership in 
environmental groups as a fraction of the population—and industry 
pressure—fraction of state employment in the manufacturing sector. 
Surprisingly, the results indicate a positive association between both 
environmental and industry pressure and the index.384 The latter 
could represent a failure of the statistical analysis to identify the 
causal effect of industry pressure on environmental policy.  
Professor Helland uses data from the EPA’s Performance 
Compliance Database to assess inspections, violations, and effluent 
discharge at 232 pulp and paper mills across thirty states under the 
CWA from 1989 to 1993.385 Enforcement of the CWA is either the 
responsibility of regional offices of the federal EPA or the 
responsibility of the states; seventy percent of the sample is under 
state control.386 With the set of potential determinants of inspections, 
violations, and effluent discharges, the authors include local 
environmental pressure (measured by the share of the state 
population belonging to the Sierra Club) and economic pressure 
(measured by the size of the plant and the local unemployment rate). 
 
381. See id. at 194 (“[I]intervention in the regulatory process—by both 
business and environmental groups—affects the likelihood of pesticide 
use restrictions.”). 
382. Id. at 194–95 (“All other things being equal, interventions by 
environmental groups have about twice the impact on the likelihood of 
cancellation as those by growers (although the combined effect of 
growers and academic commenters, who weigh in against cancellations, 
outweighs that of environmentalists).”). 
383. See Scott P. Hays, Michael Esler, & Carol E. Hays, Environmental 
Commitment among the States: Integrating Alternative Approaches to 
State Environmental Policy, 26 Publius: J. Federalism 41 (1996). 
384. See id. at 53 (“[E]nvironmental commitment is a function of pressure for 
greater commitment from both environmental groups and 
manufacturing interests . . . .”). 
385. See Eric Helland, Environmental Protection in the Federalist System: 
The Political Economy of NPDES Inspections, 36 Econ. Inquiry 305 
(1998). 
386.  Id. at 312 tbl.II. 
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The results indicate state responsibility for enforcement is associated 
with a lower probability of inspection and higher effluent discharge.387 
Greater environmental pressure is associated with a higher probability 
of a plant being inspected, lower probability of a plant being in 
violation, and lower effluent discharge.388 Plant size, particularly in 
areas of high unemployment, is associated with a lower probability of 
a plant being inspected and a higher probability of a plant being in 
violation.389  
Joskow and Schmalensee investigate the role of politics in the SO2 
tradable allowances program created by Congress in 1990390 to combat 
acid rain.391 Specifically, the authors investigate whether political 
variables help explain the allocation of allowances across electric 
utilities. The outcome examined is the difference between the actual 
allowances allocated to a given utility and the expected allocation 
derived under different objective allocation rules. Political variables 
considered include measures of the political clout of the state in which 
the utility belongs (for example, whether it is considered a swing 
state, whether it has a competitive Senate or gubernatorial election, 
and its number of electoral votes) and the committee assignments of 
its U.S. senators and representatives.392 The authors find some 
evidence that states with greater political clout fared better in terms 
of allocations.393 That said, Joskow and Schmalensee conclude: “If 
anything, the resulting allocation of Phase II allowances appears more 
to be a majoritarian equilibrium than one heavily weighted toward a 
narrowly defined set of economic or geographical interests. It is not 
strongly consistent with the predictions of standard models of interest 
group politics or of congressional control.”394  
387. Id. at 315 tbl.III. 
388. See id. at 311–12. 
389. See id. at 313 (noting that “as the unemployment rate rises, larger 
employers are inspected less frequently,” but these circumstances 
“increase[] the probability of a violation”). 
390. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2584 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
7651) (amending the Clean Air Act). 
391. See Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of 
Market‐Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 
J.L. & Econ. 37 (1998). 
392. Id. at 74. 
393. See id. at 79 (“[T]here is strong evidence that states with political 
‘clout’—because they were large states that were swing states in the 
1988 presidential election, or because they were large states that 
happened to have competitive gubernatorial campaigns in 1990, or 
because they had representatives in the House Energy and Commerce 
leadership—tended to do well in Phase II, and weak evidence that they 
also did well in Phase I, all else equal.”). 
394.  Id. at 81. 
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Another strand of the literature explicitly investigates the link 
between (fiscal) decentralization and corruption. As is the case in the 
empirical literature testing the Leviathan model, studies in this area 
must confront data issues surrounding the proper measurement of 
decentralization, the potential endogeneity of decentralization, as well 
as the proper measurement of corruption.  
Several studies use cross-country data and measure federalism 
using a discrete measure of federal structure. Professor Treisman 
analyzes country-level data on perceived corruption obtained from 
Transparency International (TI) from 1996 to 1998.395 The index is 
based on a combination of surveys of businesses, local populations, 
economic risk analysts, and country experts. Federalism is measured 
using a simply binary indicator. The number of countries covered 
varies by year, ranging from fifty-two in 1997 to eighty-five in 1998.396 
The results indicate that federal structures have a meaningful, 
positive association with corruption holding constant the level of 
economic development and democratic history of a country.397  
Professors Gerring and Thacker investigate corruption across 125 
countries using a measure developed elsewhere that combines several 
sources of data from the late 1990s.398 Federalism is measured on a 
three-point scale (non-federal, semi-federal, and federal). The results 
are in line with those found by Treisman, indicating a positive 
association between federalism and corruption.399 Interpreting the 
findings as causal, the results suggest that moving from a federal to a 
unitary system would decrease corruption. For example, Nigeria 
would fall from the seventh most corrupt country to number forty-six 
and the United States from the 108th most corrupt country to 
number 119.400 The authors conclude:  
[N]ational bureaucracies are large and interdepartmental 
transfers tend to be frequent. It is more difficult to maintain 
clientelistic networks under such circumstances. . . . Following 
Madison, largeness of size and heterogeneity of constituency 
 
395. See Daniel Treisman, The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National 
Study, 76 J. Pub. Econ. 399, 407–14 (2000). 
396. See id. at 410.  
397. See id. at 430 (“[A] state that was federal tended to rank from about 
half a point to more than one point higher on the corruption scale than 
a similar state that was unitary.”). 
398. See John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and 
Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 British J. 
Pol. Sci. 295 (2004). 
399. See id. at 310 (“[T]he findings are strong: unitarism and parliament-
arism mitigate political corruption.”). 
400. Id. at 326. 
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may be seen as conducive to more transparency, more publicity 
and more anti-corruption efforts generally, at least in so far as 
these may stem from the dynamics of political competition.401 
Bohara, Mitchell, and Mittendorff analyze corruption across roughly 
ninety countries using the World Bank Institute Governance Research 
Indicator to measure corruption in 1996, 1998, and 2000.402 Federalism 
is measured using a simply binary indicator. Contrary to the results of 
Gerring and Thacker, this analysis found no statistically meaningful 
association between federalism and corruption.403  
Other studies in the literature utilize continuous measures of 
decentralization to reflect the degree to which countries are 
decentralized in practice. Fisman and Gatti analyze corruption across 
fifty-nine countries.404 Corruption is measured using an index provided 
by the International Country Risk Guide. Decentralization is 
measured as the subnational share of total government spending 
obtained from the International Monetary Fund. The data are 
averaged over the years available from the period between 1980 and 
1995.405 In contrast to the study by Treisman, the authors find a 
meaningful, negative association between fiscal decentralization  
and corruption.406  
Professor Gulsun Arikan uses corruption data from TI for about 
forty countries in 1998 along with several measures of fiscal 
decenteralization: per capita number of local jurisdictions, per capita 
number of local and intermediate jurisdictions, share of subnational 
government employment, and the share of subnational government 
expenditures.407 The results suggest a negative—but only weakly 
statistically significant—association between decentralization and 
corruption.408 The author concludes: “The empirical results are not 
 
401. Id. at 319. 
402. See Alok K. Bohara, Neil J. Mitchell & Carl F. Mittendorff, Compound 
Democracy and the Control of Corruption: A Cross-Country 
Investigation, 32 Pol’y Stud. J. 481 (2004).  
403. See id. at 493 (“[T]he relationship between federalism and corruption is 
significant in only one of the 16 models”). 
404. See Raymond Fisman & Roberta Gatti, Decentralization and 
Corruption: Evidence Across Countries, 83 J. Pub. Econ. 325 (2002). 
405. Id. at 329–31. 
406. See id. at 326. 
407. See G. Gulsun Arikan, Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for 
Corruption?, 11 Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 175 (2004). 
408. See id. at 188 (“[A]ll of the estimated decentralization coefficients are 
positive, indicating (as expected) that greater decentralization reduces 
corruption. . . . Despite this favorable sign pattern, however, only four 
out of the first eight decentralization coefficients are significantly 
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particularly strong, but they offer tantalizing evidence that corruption 
may indeed be lower in countries where the extent of fiscal 
decentralization is high.”409 
Professors Fan, Lin, and Treisman investigate the same issues, 
except they use firm-level data.410 The World Business Environment 
Survey interviewed business managers from over 9000 firms across 
eighty countries between 1999 and 2000. Managers were asked about 
the frequency and amount of bribes paid. The primary measure of 
decentralization used captures the number of tiers of government 
within a country.411 The results indicate a meaningful association 
between this measure of decentralization and the frequency and 
amount of bribes.412 For example, adding an additional tier of 
government is associated with a 2.6% increase in the probability that 
a manager reports “‘always needing to make informal payments to get 
things done.’”413 In addition, the subnational share of government 
employment is positively associated with the frequency and amount of 
bribes.414 Interestingly, the association between government tiers and 
the frequency of bribes is only statistically meaningful for less 
developed countries once the sample is split by level of development. 
However, subnational share of government employment remains 
positively associated with corruption in both subsamples.415 Thus, the 
lack of association between government tiers and corruption among 
developed countries may reflect a lack of variation in this subsample. 
Lastly, a series of studies investigate two complementary 
questions. Analyses by Fisman and Gatti and Professors Brollo, 
Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini explore a different type of 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption. 
Specifically, each assesses the impact of federal transfers on the 
behavior of subnational governments. Fisman and Gatti utilize state-
level data from the United States to investigate whether greater 
federal transfers—yielding a divergence between state-level revenue 
generation and expenditures—result in greater corruption by state 
 
different from zero, with three of these instances showing significance at 
just the 10 percent level.”). 
409. Id. at 192. 
410. See C. Simon Fan, Chen Lin & Daniel Treisman, Political 
Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from Around the World, 93 
J. Pub. Econ. 14 (2009). 
411. Id. at 20–23. 
412. See id. at 24. 
413. Id.  
414. See id. at 29 (“[A] larger share of public employment at subnational 
levels was significantly associated with more frequent bribery . . .”). 
415. See id. at 30. 
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officials.416 Federal transfers are interpreted as inducing a “soft budget 
constraint” at the state level.417 Data on state-level corruption comes 
from the Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the 
Public Integrity Section for 1987 and measures the annual number of 
public officials (from any level of government) convicted in a state for 
abuse of public office between 1976 and 1987. This is then scaled by 
population or public sector employment in the state. The fiscal 
variable of interest is the share of state and local expenditures 
financed by federal transfers.418 The results indicate a meaningful, 
positive association between the softness of the state budget 
constraint and corruption.419  
Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini exploit discontinuities in 
the size of transfers from the federal government to municipalities in 
Brazil arising from deterministic allocation rules related to 
municipality population.420 Using data from between 2001 and 2008, 
the authors assess the impact of transfers in non-election years on 
local corruption and the quality of individuals seeking local office, 
such as the office of a municipal mayor. Corruption is measured using 
municipal audit reports prepared by an independent body, the 
Corregedoria Geral da União, under Brazil’s anti-corruption program. 
Candidate quality is measured by education.421 The results indicate 
that a ten percent increase in transfers results in at least a six percent 
increase in corruption, a seven percent increase in the probability of 
an incumbent being reelected, and a six percent reduction in the 
college graduation rates of an incumbent’s opponents.422 
 
416. See Raymond Fisman & Roberta Gatti, Decentralization and 
Corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal Transfer Programs, 113 Pub. 
Choice 25 (2002). 
417. Id. at 26–27. 
418. Id. at 27–29. 
419. See id. at 33 (“Consistent with theories emphasizing the importance of 
hardness of budget constraints, we find that the rate of prosecutions for 
abuse of public office is greater in states with higher rates of federal 
transfers.”). 
420. See Fernanda Brollo, Tommaso Nannicini, Roberto Perotti & Guido 
Tabellini, The Political Resource Curse, 103 Am. Econ. Rev. 1759 
(2013). 
421. Id. at 1769–77.  
422. See id. at 1794 (“In particular, a 10 percent increase in the federal 
transfers to municipal governments raises local corruption by 6 percent 
(broad definition, possibly including bad administration) or by 16 
percent (narrow definition, with only severe violation episodes). 
Moreover, this fiscal windfall increases the incumbent mayor’s 
probability of reelection by 7 percent, and shrinks the fraction of his 
opponents with a college degree by 6 percent.”). 
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Professors Fredriksson and Vollebergh assemble data from eleven 
industrial sectors across twelve OECD countries over the period from 
1982 to 1996.423 Instead of assessing the impact of decentralization on 
the level of corruption, the authors explore whether a given level of 
corruption has a larger impact on environmental policy in 
decentralized countries. Environmental policy is measured at the 
sector level within each country and is proxied by the aggregate 
physical energy units used per unit of value added. Corruption is 
measured using data from TI. The findings indicate a positive 
association between corruption and energy intensity (environmental 
laxity) in unitary countries.424 There is no meaningful association 
between corruption and energy intensity with federal structures.425 
The authors attribute this finding to the fact that corrupt political 
officials have less power to influence policy outcomes in decentralized 
systems.426 
In sum, the empirical literature on lobbying and corruption in 
federal systems is inconclusive for a few reasons. First, the difficulty 
of dealing with the potential endogeneity of the presence of a federal 
structure or the level of fiscal decentralization makes it unlikely that 
the results discussed here have a causal interpretation. Second, from 
the perspective of environment federalism, the debate is not over the 
choice between a federal and a unitary system. Unfortunately, studies 
using binary measures indicating a federal structure or a continuous 
measure of the number of government tiers offer little guidance on 
whether the federal or local level is responsible (or both) for the 
positive association between corruption and non-unitary systems. 
Finally, while studies assessing continuous measures of fiscal 
decentralization—such as the share of subnational government 
expenditures—are more helpful, the results are mixed and seem to 
depend on characteristics of the budget at the local level. 
 
423. See Per G. Fredriksson & Herman R.J. Vollebergh, Corruption, 
Federalism, and Policy Formation in the OECD: The Case of Energy 
Policy, 140 Pub. Choice 205 (2009). 
424. See id. at 217 (“[G]reater government corruption leads to weaker energy 
policy standards, but the effect is conditional on whether the country is 
a federal system or not. The effect of corruption is reduced in federal 
systems.”). 
425. See id. at 213. 
426. See id. at 217 (“The intuition is that the greater the number of political 
units (veto players) involved in determining policy (in a federal system), 
ceteris paribus, the larger the number of bribes paid by lobby groups, 
and the more expensive it becomes for these groups to influence policy 
through influence-seeking. The bribe offer to each political unit declines, 
and the environmental/energy policy becomes more stringent.”). 
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3. Political Participation 
Besides the potential for decentralization to affect the level of 
lobbying or corrupt activity, it also has the potential to affect 
individual participation in the political process. Decentralized policy 
making is often advocated on the grounds that individual 
participation is greater at the local level. Oates summarizes this view: 
“The basic presumption here is that more decentralized political 
systems are conducive to increase citizen impact on political outcomes 
and political participation.”427 Bednar similarly states: “Democratic 
outcomes improve with higher participation, and participation is 
boosted when one’s vote is likely to be pivotal, which is more likely in 
smaller-scale elections . . . .”428 However, a trade-off may exist if 
participation leads to policies that are not socially efficient when the 
electorate is relatively uninformed.429 
In the interest of relative brevity, this Article does not conduct a 
thorough review of the empirical literature—located predominantly 
within the political science field—on political participation. Rather, 
this Author refers the interested reader to Professor Horiuchi, who 
provides an excellent review.430 Specifically, Horiuchi begins by stating 
that American and European political scientists claim, contrary to the 
statements above, that subnational elections have lower voter turnout 
than national elections in most democracies.431 However, the author 
goes on to state that the opposite is true in select countries such as 
Australia, Canada, Finland, France, India, Italy, Northern Ireland, 
Spain, and Switzerland.432 Horiuchi posits that political participation 
depends on the likelihood that one’s vote affects the electoral outcome 
and the ability of the electoral outcome to influence policy decisions.433 
Thus, even if it is the case that subnational political participation is 
lower in many democracies, this might change with greater 
decentralization as local policy makers become more influential. That 
 
427. See Oates, supra note 16, at 1138. 
428. See Bednar, supra note 1, at 274–75. 
429. See Esty, supra note 158, at 649 (“In fact, the technical complexity of 
the regulatory process and the need to put competing values on a 
commensurate basis makes environmental decisionmaking especially 
obscure to the average citizen.”). 
430. Yusaku Horiuchi, Turnout Twist: Higher Voter Turnout in Lower-Level 
Elections (June 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology), available at http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8240. 
431.  Id. at 12.  
432.  Id. at 15.  
433. See id. at 16 (“I hypothesize that the relative level of voter turnout in 
subnational vs. national elections is a function of not only how much is 
at stake but also how much citizens’ votes count in elections.”). 
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said, devolution of environmental policy making alone may be 
insufficient to affect political participation decisions at the local level.  
4. Knowledge  
The final political economy issue that may impact a government’s 
implementation of social welfare–maximizing policies concerns 
knowledge. In the absence of any other distortions, the ability of any 
government to maximize social welfare rests first and foremost with 
the government’s knowledge of the true social welfare function. There 
are at least two reasons why, in the context of environmental 
federalism, governments may inadvertently maximize the wrong social 
welfare function. First, the scientific basis of the social welfare 
function (for example, the so-called damage functions for different 
environmental hazards) may be incorrect. Second, governments may 
overvalue the acquisition of capital due to the so-called winner’s 
curse. 
There is little empirical research related to environmental 
federalism and scientific knowledge. However, due to potential 
economies of scale and the incentive for jurisdictions to free ride, 
many advocate that scientific research be centralized regardless of the 
extent of decentralization of actual policy making. For example, Esty 
states: “Sound environmental policies depend on good science, which, 
in turn, requires a level of investment in sophisticated technical 
analysis that many smaller jurisdictions are in no position to make.”434 
On the other hand, Adler espouses concern that the “over-
centralization of scientific research may increase the risks of political 
manipulation of science.”435 Future work into the objectivity of 
scientific research conducted at various levels of government appears 
warranted. Moreover, it may be fruitful to consider a decentralized 
system of scientific research that overcomes the incentive to free ride 
through the creation of something akin to a patent system. For 
example, in the context of policy innovation (discussed in Part II.E), 
Rose-Ackerman states:  
However, there is a more innovative way to encourage low-level 
governments to search for new ways of doing things. The central 
government might institute a system of prizes awarded to 
governments after they have come up with new ideas. Prizes 
could be a function of a jurisdiction’s own activities or could be 
awarded only if the jurisdiction happened to generate the  
best project.436 
 
434. Esty, supra note 158, at 573. 
435. Adler, supra note 9, at 147. 
436. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism 
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 593, 615–16 (1980). 
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There is also little empirical research related to environmental 
federalism and the so-called winner’s curse.437 The winner’s curse 
refers to the fact that when multiple agents bid for a single good with 
an uncertain value based on unbiased, agent-specific forecasts of the 
good’s true value, the agent with the highest bid frequently ends up 
disappointed either because the bid exceeds the value of the good 
(resulting in a net loss) or because the value is less than presumed 
(resulting in a smaller net gain than envisioned).  
The winner’s curse is relevant to the environmental federalism 
debate because it suggests that in the presence of multiple 
jurisdictions bidding for mobile capital (through environmental 
standard setting) in order to maximize social welfare, the winning 
jurisdiction may set the environmental standard too low and suffer 
from the winner’s curse.438 As such, decentralized policy making, 
resulting in multiple jurisdictions competing for mobile, lumpy capital 
investments, may induce inefficiently low environmental standards 
even if all jurisdictions seek to maximize social welfare and have 
unbiased forecasts concerning the social value of attracting capital.  
Much of the empirical evidence in support of the winner’s curse is 
obtained by laboratory experiments conducted by economists. Some 
behaviors in the field have also been shown to be consistent with the 
winner’s curse.439 In sum, there is ample evidence that the winner’s 
curse is a frequent outcome not only in the laboratory, but also in 
practice. While fully rational agents should be able to eliminate the 
winner’s curse, the evidence suggests that agents possess only 
“bounded rationality” and do not recognize the difference between the 
unconditional expected value of the good and the expected value of 
the good conditional on submitting the highest bid.440  
The potential for the winner’s curse to apply to jurisdictional 
bidding for capital is very real. Engel states: “To entice new plants 
within their borders, or to prevent their existing plants from leaving, 
states offer firms lucrative packages consisting of a dizzying array of 
economic incentives.”441 That said, the only study to this Author’s 
knowledge that relates directly to interjurisdictional competition for 
 
437. But see Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse, 2 J. Econ. 
Persp. 191 (1988) (providing an early overview of the topic).  
438. See Esty, supra note 158, at 632 (citing Peter P. Swire, The Race to 
Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in 
Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 Yale L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 67, 98 (1996)). 
439. See Thaler, supra note 437; Gary Charness & Dan Levin, The Origin of 
the Winner’s Curse: A Laboratory Study, 1 Am. Econ. J.: 
Microeconomics 207 (2009). 
440. Charness & Levin, supra note 439, at 228. 
441. Engel, supra note 64, at 319. 
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capital is by Professors Greenstone and Moretti.442 The authors utilize 
data collected from various issues of Site Selection over the period 
from 1982 to 1993. Each issue details the siting decision of so-called 
million dollar plants. In particular, the winning county is listed along 
with one or two runner-up counties.443 This enables Greenstone and 
Moretti to compare the county that won the new plant to counties 
that merited final consideration but ultimately lost out on the plant. 
While the size of any inducements offered by the winning and losing 
counties is not known, the authors examine relative changes in 
property values across winners and losers to estimate the welfare 
gains experienced by winning counties. The findings are that property 
values increased by roughly 1.1% to 1.7%, indicating that winning 
counties experienced a net gain due to the attraction of the plants.444 
Thus, at least this study concludes that the stronger version of the 
winner’s curse—the winner suffering a net reduction in welfare—does 
not seem to characterize jurisdictional competition for large capital 
investments.  
In sum, there are numerous political economy issues that play a 
role in the debate over environmental federalism. Unfortunately, the 
empirical evidence is less clear than on other issues discussed in this 
Article. Empirical studies of the Leviathan model suffer from the 
empirical equivalence of Leviathan and interjurisdictional competition 
models: both predict lower tax rates in decentralized settings. 
Distinguishing between the two requires knowledge of the socially 
efficient tax rate, which is not an easy task. Empirical studies of the 
Leviathan model, as well as of the effects of decentralization on 
lobbying and corruption, suffer from the proper measurement of 
decentralization and difficulty in dealing with the potential 
endogeneity of institutional arrangements. As such, the results of 
existing studies should not be interpreted in a causal manner. Finally, 
there is limited evidence on whether decentralization of environmental 
policy making induces greater political participation and leads to 
inefficient decisions due to the winner’s curse. Nor is there much 
empirical evidence concerning the optimal structure regarding 
scientific research.   
 
442. See Michael Greenstone & Enrico Moretti, Bidding for Industrial Plants: 
Does Winning a “Million Dollar Plant” Increase Welfare? (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9844, 2003), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9844.  
443. Id. at 14, 33 tbl.1. 
444. See id. at 27 (“The most reliable data suggest that there is a relative 
trend break of 1.1–1.7% in property values.”). 
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E. Policy Instruments 
The Tiebout and interjurisdictional competition frameworks 
invoke assumptions concerning the ability of jurisdictions to 
implement a “full range of needed tax and regulatory instruments” to 
obtain efficient outcomes.445 Similarly, Dalmazzone states that 
“governments must be . . . in conditions to avail themselves of the 
best suited among expenditure, tax, and environmental policy 
instruments.”446 Part II.E will briefly discuss two final issues—
laboratory and bottom-up federalism—factoring into the debate over 
environmental federalism under this umbrella. Laboratory, or 
horizontal, federalism refers to policy replication by other subnational 
governments once one subnational government discovers a successful 
policy. Bottom-up, or vertical, federalism refers to policy adoption by 
the federal government after successful demonstration of the policy at 
the subnational level.  
1. Laboratory Federalism 
One of the virtues of decentralized policy making is the ability of 
jurisdictions to experiment with new policies, thereby developing 
potentially new and welfare-improving policy instruments.447 This 
notion is commonly referred to as laboratory federalism. Oates states 
that “a federal system may offer some real opportunities for 
encouraging such experimentation and thereby promoting ‘technical 
progress’ in public policy.”448 Adler refers to the ability of states to act 
as “environmental ‘laboratories.’”449 Bednar writes that “subnational 
governments” have the opportunity to become “laboratories of 
democracy.”450 Of course, this notion dates back at least to Justice 
Brandeis’s well-known statement: “It is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”451 
Direct empirical evidence on the value of experimentation in 
decentralized settings is limited given the difficulty of question 
 
445. See Oates, supra note 4, at 6. 
446. Dalmazzone, supra note 249, at 467. 
447. See generally William M. Shobe & Dallas Burtraw, Rethinking 
Environmental Federalism in a Warming World, 3 Climate Change 
Econ. 1 (2012) (providing an excellent introduction to many of the 
issues). 
448. Oates, supra note 16, at 1132. 
449. Adler, supra note 9, at 137. 
450. Bednar, supra note 1, at 273. 
451. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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involved. There is much literature on the diffusion of policies across 
jurisdictions, exemplified, in part, by the literature discussed in Part 
II.C on horizontal and vertical externalities in policy making. 
However, this does not shed much light on the development or 
evaluation of experimental policies in decentralized versus centralized 
settings. Thus, early explorations into this issue were entirely 
theoretical. 
The seminal study in this area is by Rose-Ackerman.452 She 
explored the incentives that local politicians have to undertake risky 
experimentation. Three conclusions are of interest. First, secure 
incumbents have little incentive to experiment and risk undermining 
their re-election prospects.453 Instead, they can choose to free ride off 
experiments conducted elsewhere. Second, local politicians may have 
an incentive to experiment even if their local position is secure if they 
aspire to federal office and are credited by the electorate for 
developing innovative local policies.454 Kostogiannis and Schwager 
provide additional theoretical support for this point.455 Finally, 
wasteful duplication of experiments at subnational levels may arise 
due to a failure to coordinate among jurisdictions and the desire for 
all politicians to implement the policy with the greatest chance  
for success.456 
Professor Strumpf focuses on the incentives for jurisdictions to 
free ride.457 If innovative policies can be easily replicated, then there is 
no advantage to being the first-mover unless there are political gains 
of the type discussed by Rose-Ackerman. Strumpf states:  
Because successful policy experiments are eventually emulated, 
they have a public good component. Experiments benefit not 
just the innovating government but also potential imitators, and 
so local governments have an incentive to free-ride off their 
neighbors. Alternatively, a central government should take this  
452. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 436. 
453. See id. at 614 (finding that “secure politicians chose low-risk projects” 
due to “the relatively low level of electoral benefit associated with a 
major success”). 
454. See id. (“[F]ederalism may encourage innovation at lower levels . . . by 
increasing the attractiveness of low-level elected office.”). 
455. See Christos Kostogiannis & Robert Schwager, On the Incentives to 
Experiment in Federations, 60 J. Urb. Econ. 484 (2006). 
456. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 436, at 594 (“[P]oliticians’ choices will 
depend upon their knowledge of other jurisdictions’ actions. If they 
ignore other governments, wasteful duplication can occur. If they hope 
to benefit from other governments’ activities, few risky projects may be 
undertaken.”). 
457. See Koleman S. Strumpf, Does Government Decentralization Increase 
Policy Innovation?, 4 J. Pub. Econ. Theory 207 (2002). 
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learning externality into account when it is deciding whether to 
consider a policy experiment.458  
Similarly, Professors Galle and Leahy write: “Innovations in 
government produce positive externalities for other jurisdictions. 
Theory therefore predicts that local government will tend to produce 
a lower than optimal amount of innovation, as officials will prefer to 
free ride on innovation by others.”459 That said, Strumpf assesses 
conditions under which free riding is more likely to occur. He predicts 
that the level of policy experimentation will be relatively greater 
under centralization as the number of subnational jurisdictions 
increases and as the similarity of these jurisdictions increases 
(specifically, as the welfare effects of different policies become more 
highly correlated across locations).460 Professors Callander and 
Harstad expand on this point, documenting that jurisdictions may opt 
for a less-than-ideal policy if this policy is less useful to other 
jurisdictions, and that incentives to do so are greater when the 
jurisdictions are similar.461  
Interestingly, the potential for subnational free riding is often 
used to justify centralization of scientific research, but is often 
omitted in the environmental federalism literature when discussing 
local policy innovation. On the one hand, Galle and Leahy state that 
“any number of scholars of federalism routinely argue that 
experimentation is a reason to favor decentralized government, 
generally acknowledging [Rose-Ackerman] with a ‘but see’ footnote 
and at most a few sentences of explanation.”462 On the other hand, 
Dalmazzone writes that “the generation and diffusion” of scientific 
research related to environmental problems is a “task that is generally 
assigned, in theory as in the real world, to the central level of 
government” as these are “activities that benefit everyone and that 
tend to be subject to important economies of scale.”463 However, while 
these positions may seem a bit contradictory at first glance, they may 
 
458. Id. at 208. 
459. Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy 
Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 Emory L.J. 1333, 1333 
(2009). 
460. See Strumpf, supra note 457, at 208–09; see also Hongbin Cai & Daniel 
Treisman, Political Decentralization and Policy Experimentation, 4 Q.J. 
Pol. Sci. 35 (2009) (examining similar issues theoretically while 
allowing for centralized experimentation to entail non-uniform policies). 
461. See Steven Callander & Bård Harstad, Experimentation in Federal 
Systems 35 (Natl. Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 19601, 
2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19601.  
462. Galle & Leahy, supra note 459, at 1337. 
463. Dalmazzone, supra note 249, at 464–65. 
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not be inconsistent. Galle and Leahy argue that policies that are 
transparent and cheap to copy are the most susceptible to free 
riding.464 This may be a more apt description of scientific research 
than subtle policy components of environmental regulation. Moreover, 
local policy makers may be more likely to receive credit for policy 
innovations than the advancement of scientific knowledge. Rabe notes 
that state-led initiatives regarding climate change may be due to the 
fact that “some states have consciously chosen to be ‘first movers,’ 
often taking bold steps with the explicit intent of trying to take 
national leadership roles on climate policy.”465 
In terms of empirical research, the questions that can be 
addressed are a bit more limited as direct assessments of whether 
centralization leads to more or less policy experimentation are difficult 
to conceptualize. Professor Volden examines whether states emulate 
successful policies implemented in other states.466 Emulation of 
successful policies by other jurisdictions is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for policy experimentation to be a benefit to 
decentralization. The author examines the specific case of the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) over the period from 
1998 to 2001.467 Specifically, Volden looks at amendments to 
particular aspects of each state’s CHIP program to see if these 
changes are driven in part by the design of other states’ CHIP 
programs that were successful in reducing the proportion of uninsured 
children in poor households. The results indicate that states are more 
likely to emulate design choices from states that achieved past 
 
464. See Galle & Leahy, supra note 459, at 1346 (“If it is very costly to 
implement domestically someone else’s experiment, if it is hard to 
acquire information about that experiment, or if it is dubious whether 
the experiment is relevant to anyone else, then the incentives for free-
riding are obviously much lessened.”). 
465. Barry G. Rabe, States on Steroids: The Intergovernmental Odyssey of 
American Climate Policy, 25 Rev. Pol’y Res. 105, 107 (2008). 
466. See Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program, 50 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 294 
(2006). 
467. See id. at 299–301. 
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success.468 However, this is only the case if these design choices do not 
necessarily result in higher costs.469 
Further studies provide anecdotal evidence in support of greater 
policy experimentation at the subnational level in the United States 
in the case of GHG reductions targets. Specifically, Professors Cale 
and Reams note that seventeen states adopted GHG reduction targets 
between 1998 and 2008 despite the federal government never ratifying 
the Kyoto Protocol.470 Rabe documents that twenty-two states—
representing roughly half of the U.S. population—adopted at least 
two of eight climate change policies over roughly this same  
time period.471 
In sum, the theoretical literature indicates that the relationship 
between decentralization and policy experimentation is not 
straightforward.472 Whether policy innovation is greater at the  
468. See id. at 302 (“The Success variable captures whether State B was 
especially effective in lowering its uninsured rate among poor children. 
Its coefficient is positive and statistically different from zero. Its effect is 
sizable. Dyads in which State B was successful have nearly a 20% 
greater odds of State A abandoning its policy in favor of that in State 
B, when compared to dyads in which State B was unsuccessful. This 
provides strong initial support for the Emulation of Successes 
Hypothesis.”). 
469. See id. at 307 (“[T]he role of best practices is somewhat evident in all 
three types of policy changes, although the coefficient on Success is 
statistically distinct from zero only for less costly policy changes and for 
those with mixed components.”). 
470. See Tabitha M. Cale & Margaret A. Reams, Influences on Adoption of 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets Among US States, 1998–2008, 3 
Open J. Pol. Sci. 39, 41 (2013) (“The 17 states with GHG reduction 
targets [by 2008] are listed in alphabetical order: Arizona, California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, Vermont and Washington.”). 
471. The eight policies include renewable electricity mandates or portfolio 
standards, carbon taxes, renewable fuel mandates or equivalent 
programs that mandate expanded use of biofuels, carbon cap-and-trade 
programs, statewide emissions reduction targets, mandatory reporting of 
carbon emissions, formal participation as a co-plaintiff in the 2007 
Supreme Court case on carbon dioxide regulation, and adoption of the 
carbon emission standards for vehicles enacted by California. Rabe, 
supra note 465, at 109–10 (“Twenty-two states representing about one-
half of the American population have enacted two or more of these eight 
climate policies, indicating a considerable degree of political support for 
policy and formal engagement in climate policy adoption. A few of these 
states, such as California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York, 
have adopted as many as six or seven of them.”). 
472. See Callander & Harstad, supra note 461, at 34 (“[T]he prominence of 
policy experimentation in policy and popular discourse has not been 
matched by development of a formal understanding of the underlying 
phenomenon.”).  
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subnational level depends on the level of fragmentation at the 
subnational level, the degree of heterogeneity across jurisdictions, the 
level of transparency and replicability of local policies, the incentives 
of policy makers, and the extent to which politicians can claim credit 
for successful policies. Goulder and Stavins state:  
The case for state-level experimentation needs to be considered 
carefully: why the laboratories should be at the state, rather 
than national, level is not clear, and—in any event—there is 
some question regarding whether state authorities will allow 
their ‘laboratory’ to be closed after the experiment has been 
completed and the information delivered.473  
In light of this, it is not surprising that Galle and Leahy conclude 
that “the question whether innovation adds to the allure of 
decentralized government is a highly nuanced one, not to be resolved 
in a footnote or an aside.”474 Unfortunately, empirical evidence on this 
issue is limited and likely to remain so given the difficulty in 
designing appropriate statistical tests of the underlying hypothesis. 
2. Bottom-Up Federalism 
Another potential virtue of decentralization is the notion of 
bottom-up federalism. Professors Shipan and Volden use this term to 
denote vertical policy diffusion from lower to upper levels of 
government.475 This question is distinct from the prior discussion of 
vertical externalities in policy making as that literature focuses 
exclusively, to the Author’s knowledge, on the effects of federal 
policies on state choices. 
Empirical evidence on the importance of bottom-up federalism is 
extremely limited. Oates provides anecdotal evidence in the context of 
the creation of a SO2 permit trading scheme in the United States.  
He writes:  
More recently, in the area of environmental policy, the 
experience in a number of states with their own forms of 
Emissions Trading was an important prelude to the adoption, in 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, of a national trading 
program in sulfur allowances to address the problem of acid 
rain. Without this experience in a number of states, I seriously 
doubt that policy-makers would have been willing to introduce 
 
473. Goulder & Stavins, supra note 337, at 256. 
474. Galle & Leahy, supra note 459, at 1339. 
475. See Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Bottom-Up Federalism: The 
Diffusion of Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States, 50 Am. J. 
Pol. Sci. 825, 825 (2006) (defining bottom-up federalism as “bottom-up 
diffusion of policies from local governments to states”). 
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such a new and unfamiliar policy measure as tradeable emissions 
rights on a national scale. More generally, since the dawn of the 
nation, programs successfully developed at the state level have 
often provided models for subsequent federal programs.476 
More generally, Bednar suggests that “[s]ubnational involvement in 
national policy making may also help to overcome bureaucratic 
inertia.”477 Rabe states:  
In many instances, early state policy engagement has provided 
models that were ultimately embraced as national policy by the 
federal government. This has been evident in a range of social 
policy domains, including health care and education, and can 
either result in federal preemption that obliterates earlier state 
roles or a more collaborative system of shared governance.478 
Shipan and Volden address this issue more formally by examining 
state and local adoptions of antismoking laws in the United States 
over the period from 1975 to 2000.479 Conceptually, the authors argue 
that greater adoptions by cities within a state may spur state action 
due to a snowball effect or it may reduce the likelihood of state action 
due to a “pressure valve” effect.480 Data on state antismoking laws 
comes from the State Cancer Legislative Database maintained by the 
National Cancer Institute. Data on city-level laws comes from the 
Local Tobacco Control Ordinance Database compiled by the 
American Nonsmokers’ Rights Foundation. The results indicate no 
meaningful effect of local laws on state propensity to adopt 
antismoking laws on average. However, further analysis reveals that 
local laws reduce the probability of state adoption in states with low 
values of legislative professionalism and raise the probability in states 
with high values.481 
 
476. Oates, supra note 16, at 1132–33. 
477. Bednar, supra note 1, at 273. 
478. Rabe, supra note 465, at 106. 
479. See Shipan & Volden, supra note 475, at 829–32. 
480. See id. at 827–28. 
481. See id. at 840 (“[L]ocal-to-state diffusion does exist, but . . . it depends 
crucially on the political environment. Ignoring the role of legislative 
professionalism and of interest groups produces evidence of neither a 
snowball nor a pressure valve effect; instead, these effects 
counterbalance each other and produce null results for the influence of 
local laws.”). 




Theoretical models used to frame the environmental federalism 
debate—based on the Tiebout and interjursidctional competition 
models—highlight several issues that play a salient role in the 
efficiency of decentralized environmental policy making: resource 
mobility, preference heterogeneity, interjursidctional externalities, 
political economy concerns, and policy instrument choice. The 
objective of this Article has been to provide a reasonably thorough, 
yet concise, survey of what we do and do not know, empirically 
speaking, concerning these various issues. While a complete 
accounting of the magnitudes of the “imperfections,” as suggested by 
Oates in the Introduction,482 is beyond the scope of the current Article 
(and perhaps any article), several preliminary conclusions can  
be drawn.  
First, environmental concerns play, at best, a small role in 
explaining patterns of resource mobility. Population mobility seems 
relatively low in most developed countries and is declining in the 
United States. Moreover, mobility seems to be driven predominantly 
by economic, as opposed to environmental, factors. That said, there is 
some evidence that environmental amenities may affect residential 
location choices along the “spatial” margin (across very spatially 
disaggregate neighborhoods). However, whether the lack of overall 
population mobility reflects immobility or convergence to some spatial 
equilibrium is unclear. Moreover, whether the threat of mobility is 
sufficient to yield an efficient, market-like outcome—akin to 
contestable markets—is also unclear. The impact of differential 
mobility rates, particularly by education, on the efficiency of 
decentralization is also unclear. Capital, while perhaps relatively more 
mobile, appears to be influenced by environmental regulation only in 
a few, highly pollution-intensive sectors. Other factors such as taxes 
and endowments of physical and human capital seem to play more 
important roles. 
Second, the empirical evidence suggests that preferences over 
environmental issues are heterogeneous, particularly across political 
ideologies, income levels, and sectors of employment. However, 
variation in preferences is much greater across countries than within 
countries. Moreover, it is not clear that individuals sort themselves 
across jurisdictions according to environmental preferences. Lastly, 
there is no empirical evidence to support the (intuitive) notion that 
subnational jurisdictions are better able to act on community 
preferences than the central government.  
Third, the empirical evidence concerning the importance of 
interjursidictional externalities is compelling, particularly as it relates 
 
482. See Oates, supra note 16, at 1136. 
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to transboundary pollution and strategic policy making. The limited 
but persuasive evidence on environment importing is also noteworthy. 
One issue in this literature that gives this Author some pause is the 
fact that externalities are less informative in understanding the spatial 
distribution of enforcement than emissions and effluent discharge. 
Moreover, it is also noteworthy that there exists limited evidence on 
whether strategic policy making is due to a race to the top or a race 
to the bottom.  
Fourth, the empirical evidence regarding political economy issues 
is less convincing and informative owing to limited data availability 
and the difficulty of dealing with the endogeneity of decentralization. 
Further empirical analysis is needed along several lines, such as the 
efficacy of environmental and industry lobbying, the propensity for 
policy makers to engage in corrupt activity, and political engagement 
by the populous at different levels of government. Furthermore, 
evidence regarding the empirical relevance of the winner’s curse in the 
competition for capital and the optimal institutional structure for 
promoting scientific research is required. Finally, significantly more 
empirical investigation is needed to assess the arguments concerning 
laboratory and bottom-up federalism in order to move these 
arguments beyond mere speculation. 
